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The Rise and Decline of the  
Intellectual Property Powers 
PETER K. YU* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its reopening to foreign trade in the late 1990s, China has been 
the poster child of intellectual property piracy and counterfeiting.1  Virtual-
ly every year, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
lists China on its watch list or priority watch list.2  The country’s piracy and 
 
* Copyright © 2012 Peter K. Yu.  Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property Law and Di-
rector, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law School.  This Article was 
presented at the Campbell Law Review Symposium on “The New Global Convergence: In-
tellectual Property, Increasing Prosperity, and Economic Networks in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury” at Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell University.  Earlier versions of 
the Article were also presented as a keynote luncheon address at the John Marshall Review 
of Intellectual Property Law Symposium on “Applications of Intellectual Property Law in 
China” at John Marshall Law School, as keynote presentations at the Intellectual Property 
Research Institute of Australia Conference on “The Rise of Innovative China: Implications 
for the Region” at the University of Technology, Sydney and the University of Melbourne, 
and as presentations at the 2012 IPR Nanhu Forum in Shenzhen, China organized by 
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, the Conference on “China’s New Environ-
ment for Intellectual Property” at Fordham University School of Law, and the University of 
Detroit Mercy Law Review Symposium on “The Future of Intellectual Property” at Univer-
sity of Detroit Mercy School of Law.  The Author is grateful to Howard Abrams, Mark Co-
hen, Benjamin Liu, and Lucas Osborn for their kind invitations and hospitality and the par-
ticipants of these events for their valuable comments and suggestions.  He would like to 
thank Michael Crook, Teresa Blake, and their highly efficient staff for patience and thought-
ful editing, and Lindsey Purdy for excellent research and editorial assistance.  Part I of this 
Article draws on research from the Author’s earlier article in the Cardozo Law Review. 
 1. For the Author’s earlier discussions on piracy and counterfeiting in China, see gen-
erally Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in 
the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to 
Partners]; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Prop-
erty in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to 
Partners II]; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China 
Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Yu, China Puzzle]; Peter K. Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property 
World, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Yu, Middle Kingdom]. 
 2. The notable exception is during the honeymoon period following China’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization in December 2001.  In April 2005, the USTR elevated 
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counterfeiting problems have also been frequently mentioned in connection 
with international intellectual property enforcement initiatives, such as the 
highly controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement3 (ACTA) and 
the equally problematic domestic legislative proposals for heightened copy-
right enforcement.4  In a recent report, the International Trade Commission 
estimated that “firms in the U.S. [intellectual property]–intensive economy 
that conducted business in China in 2009 reported losses of approximately 
$48.2 billion in sales, royalties, or license fees due to [intellectual property 
rights] infringement in China.”5 
While piracy and counterfeiting have been the focus of U.S. policy-
makers and the mainstream media for the past two decades, recent years 
have seen the emergence of another very interesting debate concerning 
China’s rapid technological rise and its focus on alternative forms of inno-
vation.6  As John Orcutt and Shen Hong recently observed, China has made 
many notable achievements in space technology, biotechnology (including 
genomics and stem cell research), information technology, nanotechnology, 
and advanced energy technology: 
 
China back to the Priority Watch List.  See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 
925. 
 3. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, available 
at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf [hereinafter 
ACTA].  See generally Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011) 
(criticizing the use of the “country club” approach to negotiate ACTA); Peter K. Yu, En-
forcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Yu, 
What Enforcement?] (suggesting ways to improve the design of an anticounterfeiting trade 
agreement); Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 
(2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret Fears] (discussing the serious concerns about ACTA). 
 4. Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Preventing Real 
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011 
(PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).  For criticisms of SOPA and PIPA, see generally Peter 
K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder Intellectual Property Enforcement, DRAKE L. 
REV. DISCOURSE, June 2012, at 16, available at http://students.law.drake.edu/lawReview/ 
docs/lrDiscourse201206-yu.pdf [hereinafter Yu, Alphabet Soup]; Letter from Prof. John R. 
Allison et al. to Members of the U.S. Cong. (July 5, 2011) (opposing PIPA).  In the interest 
of full disclosure, the Author has signed on to the law professors’ letter in opposition to 
PIPA. 
 5. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUBLICATION NO. 4226, CHINA: EFFECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON THE 
U.S. ECONOMY xiv (2011), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf. 
 6. For discussions of innovation in China, see generally DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL 
MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN: GOVERNMENT, INNOVATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA (2011); JOHN L. ORCUTT & SHEN HONG, SHAPING CHINA’S 
INNOVATION FUTURE: UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION (2011); TAN 
YINGLAN, CHINNOVATION: HOW CHINESE INNOVATORS ARE CHANGING THE WORLD (2011); 
ZENG MING & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, DRAGONS AT YOUR DOOR: HOW CHINESE COST 
INNOVATION IS DISRUPTING GLOBAL COMPETITION (2007). 
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  China is one of only three countries to put a person in space with 
its own rockets (and China recently conducted its first spacewalk). 
  Chinese research teams helped to map the genome for rice and 
have since helped to extend genomic sequencing to other plants, as 
well as a variety of insects and parasites. 
  China passed the United States as the leading exporter of infor-
mation-technology goods in 2004. 
  China has become a world leader in the field of nanotechnolo-
gy—producing major nanotechnology breakthroughs (e.g., im-
proved production of carbon nano-tubes) and generating a signifi-
cant portion of the world’s nanotechnology publications and 
patents and new nanotechnology firms. 
  China has long been a leader in nuclear technology and is posi-
tioned to become a leader in a number of other energy fields, in-
cluding clean coal and hydropower.7 
Today, China is already among the top five countries filing patent ap-
plications through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).8  In 2011, the 
number of applications filed under that treaty increased by 33.4% to 
16,406, earning China the fourth spot, behind only the United States, Japan, 
and Germany.9  Among all the applicants, ZTE Corp. and Huawei Tech-
nologies, respectively, had the largest and third largest number of PCT ap-
plications, while Panasonic ranked the second.10  With significant backing 
from the Chinese government and the anticipated involvement of the 
world’s largest public sector, China will likely catch up with the existing 
intellectual property powers more quickly than many are prepared for. 
Notwithstanding these many impressive economic and technological 
developments, the narrative about piracy and counterfeiting in China is 
rarely linked to the narrative about China’s technological rise.  In fact, 
commentators who recount developments concerning these two narratives 
rarely talk to each other.  To provide a more comprehensive picture, and a 
deeper understanding of the implications of China’s improvements in the 
intellectual property arena, this Article brings together these two different 
narratives to explore what their combination would mean for the United 
States and its intellectual property industries. 
 
 7. ORCUTT & SHEN, supra note 6, at ix. 
 8. Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org., International Patent Filings Set New 
Record in 2011 (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/ 
2012/article_0001.html. 
 9. Id.  The estimated figures for the United States, Japan, and Germany are 48,596, 
38,888, and 18,568, respectively. 
 10. Id. 
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Part I delivers some good news for intellectual property rights holders 
from around the world that conduct business in China.  It points out that 
China is at the cusp of crossing over from a pirating nation to a country re-
spectful of intellectual property rights.  This Part draws on the historical 
developments of intellectual property protection in the United States and 
other once-developing countries. 
Part II bears some bad news for intellectual property rights holders.  It 
shows that, even though China will finally experience improvements in the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights when it hits the 
proverbial crossover point, such improvements will bring some disap-
pointments.  This Part focuses on three unintended consequences brought 
about by rapid and dramatic improvements in the Chinese intellectual 
property system: (1) an intellectual property litigation explosion in China; 
(2) the United States’ reduced competitive edge over China; and (3) barri-
ers to future intellectual property reform in the United States. 
In light of both the good and bad news delivered in the first two Parts, 
Part III offers suggestions on three types of policy changes that could help 
prepare U.S. industries for the challenges identified in the Article.  Specifi-
cally, this Part examines the need to revamp domestic, bilateral, and multi-
lateral policies.  Although this Part focuses primarily on U.S. policies, it is 
important to remember that a satisfactory response to the challenges identi-
fied in Part II will require more than unilateral action on the part of the 
United States. 
Part IV concludes on a more comforting note.  This Part explains why, 
despite all these challenges, the United States may still have time and wig-
gle room to decide its course of action in the near future.  It nevertheless 
underscores the need for intellectual property policymakers to take serious-
ly China’s technological rise and the challenges identified in the Article. 
I.  THE CROSSOVER POINT 
A. The Chinese Experience 
Piracy and counterfeiting has been the subject of a perennial dispute 
between China and the United States since the former’s re-opening to for-
eign trade in the late 1980s.  While the U.S. administration and American 
rights holders were initially patient, especially in view of the potential for 
opening up what could be the world’s largest market for U.S. goods and 
services, their patience slowly eroded.11  During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
 
 11. See Warren H. Maruyama, U.S.-China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual Prop-
erty, and the Rule of Law in a Global Economy, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
AND PRACTICE 165, 186 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (“At a 1985 meeting to the U.S.-
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss3/5
2012] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POWERS 529 
United States repeatedly threatened China with economic sanctions, trade 
wars, nonrenewal of most-favored-nation status, and opposition to China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).12  In response, China 
made several major revisions to its intellectual property laws.13  The coun-
try also undertook considerable institutional reforms while joining more 
than a dozen international intellectual property treaties.14  In December 
2001, China finally became the 143rd member of the WTO,15 assuming ob-
ligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights16 (TRIPS Agreement). 
As of this writing, the levels of protection and enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights in China still have not met the satisfaction of the U.S. 
government and its supportive intellectual property rights holders.  Never-
theless, such protection and enforcement has dramatically improved.  In 
fact, the biggest challenge for intellectual property rights holders in China 
is no longer about the low standards of protection, but the limited effec-
tiveness in enforcement.17  Enforcement problems have created challenges 
for rights holders in not only the intellectual property area, but across the 
board in the whole country.18  As far as intellectual property rights are con-
cerned, the enforcement problems are well illustrated by the complaint the 
United States filed before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in April 
2007.19 
 
China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), the U.S. for the first time ex-
pressed concerns about weak Chinese IPR standards.  In 1987, the U.S. put IPR protection 
on the agenda for U.S.-China market access talks.”). 
 12. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 1, at 140–51. 
 13. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 975–99 (examining the pro-
gress China has made in the intellectual property area); Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 1, at 
185–88 (tracing the development of the intellectual property regime in China). 
 14. See Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 1 (identifying the various international treaties 
of which China is a member). 
 15. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_ 
e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited June 22, 2012). 
 16. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 
4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994). 
 17. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2005 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON 
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 95 (2005) (“[W]hile China has made significant progress in its 
efforts to make its framework of laws, regulations and implementing rules WTO-consistent, 
serious problems remain, particularly with China’s enforcement of intellectual property 
rights.”). 
 18. See generally CHEN JIANFU, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 653–92 
(2008) (providing an excellent discussion of the implementation and enforcement problems 
within the Chinese legal system). 
 19. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting the 
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 16, 2007).  
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Notwithstanding these enforcement problems, China has actively pur-
sued an intellectual property agenda.  In June 2008, the State Council 
adopted a pioneering National Intellectual Property Strategy,20 which pro-
vides a comprehensive plan to improve the protection and management of 
intellectual property rights while emphasizing the need for active develop-
ment of home-grown intellectual property (zizhu zhishi chanquan).21  The 
top Chinese leadership has also increasingly recognized the economic and 
strategic importance of a well-functioning intellectual property system.  As 
President Hu Jintao remarked in the Group Study of the Political Bureau of 
the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in May 2006: 
Strengthening the building of China’s system of intellectual property right 
and vigorously upgrading the capacity of creation, management, protection 
and application regarding intellectual property are our urgent need for the 
purpose of enhancing independent and self-driven innovation capabilities 
and building an innovation-oriented country.22 
Taking the lead of President Hu and other leaders, the State Intellectual 
Property Office (SIPO) set very ambitious goals for its National Patent De-
velopment Strategy (2011–2020).23  Included in the 2015 targets are the fol-
lowing goals: 
The annual quantity of applying for patents for inventions, utility models 
and designs [in China] will reach 2 million.  China will rank among the top 
two in the world in terms of the annual number of patents for inventions 
granted to the domestic applicants, and the quality of patents filed will fur-
ther improve.  The number of owning patents every one million people and 
 
For the panel report on and further discussions of the dispute, see Panel Report, China—
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009); Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. 
REV. 1046 (2011); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 727 (2011). 
 20. STATE COUNCIL, COMPENDIUM OF CHINA NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
STRATEGY (2008). 
 21. See id. ¶ 7; see also Wu Handong, One Hundred Years of Progress: The Develop-
ment of the Intellectual Property System in China, 1 WIPO J. 117, 121 (2009) (discussing 
the importance of “self-driven” intellectual property). 
 22. Wu, supra note 21, at 120; see also PANG LAIKWAN, CREATIVITY AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: CHINA’S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
OFFENSES 8 (2012) (“If gaige kaifang (reform and open) was the dominant policy principle 
of the PRC government in the 1980s and 1990s, the recent Hu Jintao government has shifted 
its attention to gaige chuangxin (reform and innovation), emphasizing the importance of 
innovation and production of the new.” (Chinese characters omitted)); Yu, From Pirates to 
Partners, supra note 1, at 189–96 (discussing the need to convince Chinese leaders of the 
benefits of intellectual property protection). 
 23. STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
(2011–2020) (2011), translated at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/ 
SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf. 
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the number of overseas patent applications filed by Chinese applicants will 
double.  The proportion of patent applications in industrial enterprises 
above designated size will reach 8% and the quantity of owning patent 
rights will significantly rise. . . .  The patent transaction services will be es-
tablished in major cities of China with annual patent transaction amounts 
reaching 100 billion yuan. . . .  The patent examiner[s] will reach 9,000. . . .  
The talents in the patent service industry will be greater and the profession-
al categories will be more complete, with certified patent agents reaching 
10,000.24 
In addition, SIPO has been very active in developing professional ties 
with patent offices from around the world.  In 2007, for example, its offi-
cials met their counterparts from the European Patent Office, the Japanese 
Patent office, the Korean Intellectual Property Office, and the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office to discuss ways to “improv[e] the efficiency 
of their examination systems and to harmonize their office systems.”25  
These so-called “IP5” discussions, which are ongoing, further strengthen 
SIPO’s status as “a player in the top tier of patent offices that will dominate 
the emerging system of global patent administration.”26 
While questions remain concerning what a country could do with two 
million patents per year and whether such ambitious goals would result in 
low patent quality,27 it is hard not to be amazed by the quick turnaround 
China has experienced in the intellectual property area in less than three 
decades.  Although the country did not have its first patent law until 1984, 
it is now on track to have the world’s largest volume of patent filings.  
When questioned by The New York Times about SIPO’s 2015 targets, Da-
vid Kappos, the director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
could not help but describe those numbers as “mind-blowing.”28 
In sum, ample evidence suggests that China is now at the cusp of 
crossing over from the less promising side of the intellectual property di-
vide to the more promising one.29  Nevertheless, it remains to be seen when 
 
 24. Id. at 4–5. 
 25. PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND 
THEIR CLIENTS 236 (2010). 
 26. Id. at 233; see also id. (noting that, since 1994, the Chinese Patent Office, and later 
SIPO, has served as an international searching authority for PCT purposes). 
 27. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR 
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 12 (2004) (“[T]he rapid increase in the rate of patenting has been accompanied by 
a proliferation of patent awards of dubious merit.”). 
 28. Steve Lohr, When Innovation, Too, Is Made in China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02unboxed.html (quoting USPTO Director 
David Kappos). 
 29. See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 1, at 175 (“[H]istory suggests that China is now 
simply following the economic development paths of Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South 
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China will hit the proverbial crossover point.  It is also unclear whether 
China will experience multiple crossover points, which arise as a result of 
the country’s highly uneven developments across geographical regions and 
economic and technological sectors.30 
B. The U.S. Experience 
To better understand how China crosses over from one side of this di-
vide to the other, and the implications of such a crossover, it is instructive 
to revisit the early development of intellectual property protection for for-
eign authors in the United States.  Although the United States offered intel-
lectual property protection to domestic authors since the founding of the 
Republic—through state laws initially and federal laws less than a decade 
later31—it did not offer similar protection to foreigners.  Section 5 of the 
1790 Copyright Act, the country’s first copyright law, explicitly stated: 
Nothing in this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importation 
or vending, reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any map, 
chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any person not a cit-
 
Korea, Taiwan—or even Germany and the United States.  It is only a matter of time before 
China is converted from a pirating nation to a country that respects intellectual property 
rights.”); see also Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undeter-
mined Future, 1 WIPO J. 1, 10–15 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Global Intellectual Property Or-
der] (discussing the existence of a “crossover point” where countries consider it to be in 
their self-interest to move from a pirating nation to one that strongly respects intellectual 
property rights).  Noted China scholar Kenneth Lieberthal concurred: 
Every current advanced industrial economy went through a phase of development 
characterized by widespread theft of intellectual property.  But over time in each 
such economy some domestic players developed their own intellectual property 
and became sufficiently powerful in the political system that they moved the sys-
tem toward more effective IP [intellectual property] protection.  The question is 
whether a similar process is unfolding in China and whether it may take hold as 
Chinese producers move up the technology innovation ladder with government 
encouragement and support. 
  There are clear indicators that China’s evolution is following the IP paths that 
others have trod. 
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, MANAGING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: HOW TO ACHIEVE CORPORATE 
SUCCESS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 26–27 (2011). 
 30. See Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order, supra note 29, at 13–14 (“Because of 
their complex economic situations, these countries may also have more than one crossover 
point, depending on whether one focuses on a specific geographical region or the relevant 
economic sector.”). 
 31. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 338–40 (2003).  
The first state to enact copyright legislation was Connecticut.  An Act for the Encourage-
ment of Literature and Genius (Jan. 1783), reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1783–1906, at 11 (Thorvald Solberg ed., 2d rev. ed. 1906).  The first federal 
Copyright Act was enacted in 1790.  Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. 
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izen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction 
of the United States.32 
Although commentators have used the specific needs of a developing 
country to justify the early development of U.S. copyright law,33 it is worth 
noting that copyright protection to foreign authors was uncommon in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.34  At that time, many coun-
tries “did not . . . regard the piracy of foreign authors’ works as unfair or 
immoral.  Some countries, in fact, openly countenanced piracy as contrib-
uting to their educational and social needs and as reducing the prices of 
books for their citizens.”35 
While the lack of copyright protection to foreign authors in the 1790 
Copyright Act hurt all foreign authors, such a lack was particularly damag-
ing to English authors,36 who write in the same language as their American 
 
 32. Act of May 31, 1790, § 5, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (emphasis added). 
 33. See, e.g., RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT: UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, 
AND ARTISTIC WORKS 859 (10th ed. 2009) (“[I]t is perhaps not surprising that a have-not 
country should permit and even encourage poaching on foreign works, but the same policy 
continued even as the nation grew.”); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 199 (1968) (noting the need to protect the new nation against the established 
trade in England); EDWARD W. PLOMAN & L. CLARK HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 16 (1980) (“Complete with a piracy provision it can be 
viewed as the action of a developing country to protect its burgeoning culture while exploit-
ing the cultural products of more developed nations.”); Thomas Bender & David Sampliner, 
Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of American Literature, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 255, 
255 (1997) (arguing that the United States did not afford intellectual property protection for 
non-U.S. citizens until it became a major industrial power). 
 34. See EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 231 (2000) (noting 
that “the copyright law of many other countries at that time was not any more protective of 
the rights of foreign authors” than the 1790 Copyright Act); Henry G. Henn, The Quest for 
International Copyright Protection, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 43, 43 (1953) (“Until a century ago, 
the general rule, with a few standout exceptions, was that domestic works were eligible for 
protection and foreign works were not.” (footnote omitted)); Sam Ricketson, The Birth of 
the Berne Union, 11 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 9, 12 (1986) (noting that piracy activities 
“had been a long-established feature of European social and cultural life”); Barbara A. 
Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright—Past, Present, and Fu-
ture, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1051 (1968) (“[I]nternational copyright protection was the excep-
tion rather than the rule.”). 
 35. SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 231; see also STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 25 (1938) (“[I]n Belgium the general 
belief was that such unauthorized reprints of French books without any payment to the au-
thors was a perfectly honorable thing.”). 
 36. See S.M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 25 (2d 
ed. 1989); see also LADAS, supra note 35, at 26 (noting that “systematic piracy was commit-
ted in the United States of works published in all foreign countries, especially in England”); 
Henn, supra note 34, at 52 (“The United States had been among the most parochial of na-
9
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readers.  In the post-revolutionary period, English literature was extensive-
ly read throughout the United States.37  Between 1800 and 1860, almost 
half of the bestsellers in the United States were pirated, mostly from Eng-
lish novels.38  As Sydney Smith rhetorically questioned in the Edinburgh 
Review in January 1820, “In the four quarters of the globe, who reads an 
American book?”39 
In the beginning, some English authors were able to secure from 
American publishers the so-called “courtesy copyright”—an unwritten cus-
tom of self-restraint whereby each major publishing house refrained from 
publishing editions of a foreign work that was already the subject of an 
agreement between its author and another publishing house.40  This system 
not only “protected the first American publisher of a foreign work from the 
unfettered copying of his edition, [but also] gave the author the opportunity 
of earning some remuneration, even if he were unable to prevent the Amer-
ican publication of his work in the first place.”41  By virtue of this arrange-
ment, some English authors, such as Charles Dickens and Anthony Trol-
lope, “received large sums in respect of the American sales of their works, 
although they did not enjoy protection under United States copyright 
law.”42 
As competition in the United States heated up and as more publica-
tions came from smaller publishing houses, courtesy copyright became in-
effective.43  Among the English authors who were greatly concerned about 
 
tions so far as copyright protection for published works is concerned.  For over a hundred 
years, this nation not only denied copyright protection to published works by foreigners, . . . 
but appeared to encourage the piracy of such works.”). 
 37. See S. REP. NO. 134, 24th Cong., 2d Sess. (1837), reprinted in R.R. BOWKER, 
COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND LAW: BEING A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES AND LAW OF 
COPYRIGHT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BOOKS 341 (1912) [hereinafter CLAY’S REPORT]; 
see also SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 231 (noting that very few American authors were ac-
corded serious attention in England in the early nineteenth century). 
 38. See STEWART, supra note 36, at 25 (quoting JOHN WILLIAM TEBBEL, A HISTORY OF 
BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED STATES (1972)). 
 39. Sydney Smith, Who Reads an American Book?, EDINBURGH REV., Jan. 1820, at 68, 
79, quoted in United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260, 264 (1908). 
 40. See Ricketson, supra note 34, at 13–14; see also SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, 
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT 
THREATENS CREATIVITY 52 (2001) (discussing courtesy copyrights). 
 41. Ricketson, supra note 34, at 14. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 52–53 (discussing the emergence of cheap 
library editions).  As Professor Vaidhyanathan described: 
The paper was uniformly cheap and flimsy, the typesetting sloppy, and the format 
hard to read.  Some of the earlier editions lacked covers to keep their costs low.  
But soon the cheap publishers realized that the spine was in many cases the most 
10
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss3/5
2012] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POWERS 535 
the lack of copyright protection in the United States were Dickens, Trol-
lope, and the famous operetta duo of Gilbert and Sullivan.44 
In 1838, after the passage of the first International Copyright Act in 
Britain,45 Lord Palmerston, the British prime minister, initiated high-level 
contacts with the United States to explore the establishment of a bilateral 
copyright treaty.46  This effort failed, to the disappointment of British au-
thors.47  A few years later, Charles Dickens traveled to the United States to 
plead for greater protection of British works.48  That effort also failed.  As 
Dickens recounted in frustration his unsuccessful trip to America: 
I spoke, as you know, of international copyright, at Boston; and I spoke of 
it again at Hartford.  My friends were paralysed with wonder at such auda-
cious daring.  The notion that I, a man alone by himself, in America, should 
venture to suggest to the Americans that there was one point on which they 
were neither just to their own countrymen nor to us, actually struck the 
boldest dumb!  It is nothing that of all men living I am the greatest loser by 
it.  It is nothing that I have to claim to speak and be heard.  The wonder is 
that a breathing man can be found with temerity enough to suggest to the 
Americans the possibility of their having done wrong.  I wish you could 
have seen the faces that I saw, down both sides of the table at Hartford, 
when I began to talk about [Sir Walter] Scott.  I wish you could have heard 
how I gave it out.  My blood so boiled as I thought of the monstrous injus-
 
attractive—and most visible—part of a book.  So by the 1880s, most of the cheap 
books libraries appeared in cloth bindings at a slightly higher price, but with the 
same cheap paper inside.  Needless to say, none of these publishers were part of 
the eastern seaboard elite club of publishers who were led by Henry Holt [a lead-
ing publisher at the time].  So none of them conformed to the courtesy principle. 
Id. at 53. 
 44. See SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 232–34, 238–39 (discussing Anthony Trollope’s 
and Gilbert and Sullivan’s copyright problems in the United States); Gerhard Joseph, 
Charles Dickens, International Copyright, and the Discretionary Silence of Martin Chuz-
zlewit, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 523 (1992) (demonstrating how Martin Chuzzlewit 
reflects Dickens’s distress over the United States’ lack of copyright protection to British au-
thors); see also Carte v. Evans, 27 F. 861 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886) (concerning the infringement 
on copyright in The Mikado); Carte v. Duff, 25 F. 183 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885) (concerning the 
infringement on copyright in The Mikado); Carte v. Ford, 15 F. 439 (C.C.D. Md. 1883) 
(concerning the infringement on copyright in Iolanthe). 
 45. International Copyright Act, 1 & 2 Vict. ch. 59 (1838). 
 46. See Geo. Haven Putnam, Literary Property: An Historical Sketch, in THE QUESTION 
OF COPYRIGHT: A SUMMARY OF THE COPYRIGHT LAWS AT PRESENT IN FORCE IN THE CHIEF 
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 35, 66 (1891) [hereinafter QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT]. 
 47. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 51. 
 48. See Hamish Sandison, The Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion: The American Experience, 11 COLUM.-VLA. J.L. & ARTS 89, 92 (1986). 
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tice that I felt as if I were twelve feet high when I thrust it down their 
throats.49 
Contemporaneous with these external efforts, local support for greater 
protection for foreign authors slowly grew in the United States.  In 1837, 
Senator Henry Clay submitted a report recommending the enactment of in-
ternational copyright legislation to extend copyright protection to British 
and French authors in the United States.50  The report included an address 
and petition by fifty-six prominent British authors, maintaining that their 
fellow authors were “exposed to injury in their reputation and property.”51  
The petition further stated that British works were “liable to be mutilated 
and altered, at the pleasure of [American] booksellers, or of any other per-
sons who may have an interest in reducing the price of the works, or in 
conciliating the supposed principles or prejudice of purchasers in [the Unit-
ed States].”52 
In addition, the petition appealed to the national interests of American 
authors, noting the lack of incentives for American publishers to afford lo-
cal authors a fair remuneration for their labors when these publishers could 
obtain foreign works “by unjust appropriation, instead of by equitable pur-
chase.”53  At the time of the petition, an American pirated edition was 
priced at about a quarter of the cost of a legitimate English edition; the 
price could go down to even a tenth of that cost.54  As Siva Vaidhyanathan 
recounted: “A London reader who wanted a copy of Charles Dickens’s A 
Christmas Carol would have to pay the equivalent of $2.50 in 1843 [while 
a]n American Dickens fan would have to pay only six cents per copy.”55 
Finally, the petition warned that the lack of effective protection for 
foreign authors might confuse the American public “as to whether the 
books presented to them as the works of British authors . . . [were] the ac-
tual and complete productions of the writers whose names they b[ore].”56  
The petition also provided an emotional reminder about Sir Walter Scott, 
the author of Ivanhoe.  Scott was extensively read in the United States, but 
died in destitute despite his wild success as an author.  As the petition sur-
mised, Scott would have survived from “the burden of debts and destruc-
 
 49. Letter from Charles Dickens to John Foster (Feb. 24, 1842), reprinted in Sandison, 
supra note 48, at 92. 
 50. CLAY’S REPORT, supra note 37. 
 51. Id. ¶ 1. 
 52. Id. ¶ 4. 
 53. Id. ¶ 8. 
 54. See STEWART, supra note 36, at 25. 
 55. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 50. 
 56. CLAY’S REPORT, supra note 37, ¶ 9. 
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tive toils” had he received remuneration from the American public for his 
creative endeavors.57 
Despite the efforts of Senator Clay and other supporters, Congress did 
not grant any protection to foreign authors until the 1870s.58  Indeed, the 
attitudes toward protecting foreign authors in the United States did not 
dramatically improve until a critical mass of local stakeholders emerged.  
In the mid-nineteenth century, many American authors, such as James Fen-
imore Cooper, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Washington 
Irving, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Herman Melville, Edgar Allan Poe, 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, Henry David Thoreau, and Walt Whitman, began 
attracting readership in England and other European countries.59  Because 
most copyright laws were made conditional on reciprocity in other coun-
tries, the lack of protection for foreign authors resulted in American authors 
being denied similar rights under foreign law.60 
 
 57. Id. ¶ 10. 
 58. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 51.  As Professor Vaidhyanathan recount-
ed: 
Clay submitted a bill five times between 1837 and 1842.  All five attempts failed.  
Booksellers and typesetters opposed the bills.  Several prominent American au-
thors and political leaders, including Washington Irving, Edward Everett, and 
John Quincy Adams, supported the bills.  Only two major publishing houses, Ap-
pleton and Putnam, supported Clay’s bills. 
Id.; see also Ringer, supra note 34, at 1055 (“The Clay bill was reintroduced several times 
between 1837 and 1842, but never reached a vote.”).  Likewise, “unsuccessful attempts to 
establish copyright treaty relations with Great Britain were made in 1837, 1863, and again in 
1880–81, foundering each time on the opposition of American publishers who believed that 
their financial success depended upon being able to sell cheap reprints of British books.”  
Sandison, supra note 48, at 92. 
 59. See SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 231. 
 60. See id. at 232; see also VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 56 (“Twain started stud-
ying copyright laws during the 1870s when he lost substantial money to Canadian pirates 
who had recopied his work without offering him compensation.”).  Max Kempelman noted 
the lack of protection granted to American authors in England: 
Longfellow asserted a few years before his death that he had twenty-two publish-
ers in England and Scotland, but that “only four of them took the slightest notice 
of my existence, even so far as to send me a copy of the book.”  Harriet Beecher 
Stowe too is reported to have received no return whatever for her Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, even though it sold more than 1/2 million copies in Great Britain during its 
first year alone. 
Max Kempelman, The United States and International Copyright, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 
413 (1947).  Nonetheless, as Professor Samuels pointed out: 
It was apparently possible under the existing laws for particularly resourceful 
Americans to obtain protection in England by simultaneous publication there, or 
for resourceful British citizens to obtain protection in the United States by simul-
taneous publication here, but protection apparently required that the author travel 
to the other country and reside there at the time of publication.  Or an author 
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Even worse for these authors, the lack of copyright protection for for-
eign authors had created a lot of cheap imports that competed unfairly and 
directly against works written by local authors.61  Alarmed by the situation, 
a growing number of American authors and publishers began to seek “a 
more level playing field for their editions of American works.”62  Some 
openly discussed how the then-copyright policy had failed to serve the in-
terests of the American people by keeping foreign works cheap.  As Mark 
Twain wrote in Century Magazine in 1886: 
The statistics of any public library will show that of every hundred books 
read by our people, about seventy are novels—and nine-tenths of them for-
eign ones.  They fill the imagination with an unhealthy fascination with 
foreign life, with its dukes and earls and kings, its fuss and feathers, its 
graceful immoralities, its sugar-coated injustices and oppressions; and this 
fascination breeds a more or less pronounced dissatisfaction with our coun-
try and form of government, and contempt for our republican commonplac-
es and simplicities; it also breeds a longing for something “better” which 
presently crops out in the diseased shams and imitations of the ideal foreign 
spectacle: Hence the “dude.”63 
Just as local stakeholders began to emerge in the United States, the 
conditions and protections of authors also greatly improved across the At-
lantic in the mid-nineteenth century.  As Stephen Ladas recounted: 
The nineteenth century brought profound changes in the conditions upon 
which the rights of authors were based.  In the political field, the liberty of 
 
might be able to convey the publication rights to a citizen of the other country be-
fore publication; but that rarely led to a very reasonable payment. 
SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 232. 
 61. Max Kempelman explained in detail the plight of American authors: 
The practice hurt American authors . . . for their works had to meet the unfair 
competition of British books which were cheaper because they were not paid for.  
American readers were less inclined to read the novels of Cooper or Hawthorne 
for a dollar when they could buy a novel of Scott or Dickens for a quarter. . . .  
American men of letters were, therefore, apart from any other considerations, un-
able to rely on literature for a livelihood.  Longfellow and Lowell were college 
professors; Hawthorne was in the government service; Emerson engaged in lectur-
ing.  And American readers were weaned on a literature not their own. 
Kempelman, supra note 60, at 413; see also VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 59 (“While 
the first American edition of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer sold by subscription for $2.75 
in 1876, the Canadian pirated editions sold for 50 cents to $1 per copy.  Meanwhile, readers 
had to choose between buying an emerging American author’s new work for at least 50 
cents per copy, or Sir Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe for 10 to 15 cents.”); Ringer, supra note 34, at 
127 (“By protecting only works of American authors, the new law sanctioned the unre-
strained reprinting of popular English writers, to the disastrous competitive disadvantage of 
the very indigenous American literature it was pledged to encourage.”). 
 62. SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 235. 
 63. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40, at 61 (quoting Mark Twain). 
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the press, the destruction of the division of social classes, the dissemination 
of education, the reinforcement of national unity by the use of national lan-
guages instead of separate dialects; in the social and economic field, new 
processes of reproduction of literary and artistic works, the expansion of 
the press, the creation of new universities, libraries, museums and exposi-
tions, the development of bookselling and the wider circulation of books, 
the learning of foreign languages and the more general travelling of people 
from one country to another—all these facts created new conditions for the 
works of authors and artists.  Writing and the cultivation of the arts came to 
be a real profession and those engaged in it expected to be supported by it 
and no longer by Maecenas and Royal Courts.  As a result authors began to 
demand a fuller protection of their rights, and to raise much outcry against 
the injustice done them by the pirating of their works in foreign countries.64 
In 1886, the major European powers and a few other like-minded 
countries succeeded in establishing the Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works65 (Berne Convention).  Although the United 
States only participated in the negotiation conference as an observer66 and 
did not join the Convention until more than a century later,67 Congress, in 
the face of strong pressure from American authors and some local publish-
ers, actively considered proposals to provide reciprocal copyright protec-
tion to foreign authors within the United States.68  Meanwhile, countries in 
the American continents also explored the possibility of creating Pan-
American copyright conventions similar to what European countries estab-
lished in Berne.69 
 
 64. LADAS, supra note 35, at 23–24. 
 65. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971).  The text of the original Berne Conven-
tion is reprinted in LADAS, supra note 35, at 1123–34. 
 66. Although the United States did not sign the original Berne Convention, its delegate, 
Boyd Winchester, held out the promise of accession if the circumstances should become 
appropriate: 
Whilst not prepared to join the proposed Convention as a full Signatory, the Unit-
ed States does not thereby wish to be understood as opposing the measure in any 
way, but on the contrary, desires to reserve without prejudice the privilege of fu-
ture accession to the Convention, should it become expedient and practicable to 
do so . . . .  This position and attitude of the United States is one of expectancy 
and reserve. 
LADAS, supra note 35, at 29–30 (quoting Winchester). 
 67. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 
2853 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).  The Berne Convention entered 
into force in the United States on March 1, 1989. 
 68. See LADAS, supra note 35, at 27. 
 69. See Ringer, supra note 34, at 1060. 
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In 1891, the United States Congress finally enacted the International 
Copyright Act of March 3, 1891.70  Under what was commonly referred to 
as the Chace Act,71 foreign authors received copyright protection when the 
President of the United States proclaimed that their home country provided 
American citizens with “the benefit of copyright on substantially the same 
basis as its own citizens” or that such a country was a party to an interna-
tional agreement that provided reciprocal copyright protection to its mem-
bers and to which “the United States may, at its pleasure, become a par-
ty.”72  By offering protection to foreign authors (in addition to local 
authors), the United States finally crossed over from the unpromising side 
of the intellectual property divide to the more promising one.73 
Today, the United States is no longer the notorious pirate that it was in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Rather, it has actively championed 
the cause for greater protection of copyrighted works throughout the world.  
It has also become one of the predominant intellectual property powers 
pushing for stronger levels of protection and enforcement around the 
world.74  Not only was the United States instrumental in establishing the 
TRIPS Agreement,75 it has also applied continual pressure to induce devel-
 
 70. International Copyright Act of March 3, 1891 (Chace Act), Ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106. 
 71. The statute’s longer name is Chace-Breckinridge-Adams-Simonds-Platt Copyright 
Act of 1891.  Analysis of the Provisions of the Copyright Law of 1891, in QUESTION OF 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 46, at 176. 
 72. Section 13 of the Chace Act provides: 
That this act shall apply to a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation when 
such foreign state or nation permits to citizens of the United States of America the 
benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as its own citizens; or when 
such foreign state or nation is a party to an international agreement which pro-
vides for reciprocity in the granting of copyright, by the terms of which agreement 
the United States may, at its pleasure, become a party to such agreement. 
Chace Act § 5.  “This system [of Presidential proclamations] has proved cumbersome and 
ineffective in comparison with the simplicity, certainty, and other advantages offered by 
multilateral arrangements.”  Ringer, supra note 34, at 1058. 
 73. It is worth noting that the United States, at that time, already provided strong pro-
tection to local authors.  The United States’ crossover experience was therefore not identical 
to that of China.  Nevertheless, one could make a strong argument that discriminating 
against foreign authors is far worse than not offering adequate protection to all types of au-
thor—both local and foreign.  While the former favors the discriminating country, the latter 
involves the sacrifice of local authors.  The latter therefore incurs greater political costs on 
the part of the country’s leadership. 
 74. For an interesting discussion of why the United States underwent a 180-degree 
change in its approach toward intellectual property protection, see J. Thomas McCarthy, 
Intellectual Property—America’s Overlooked Export, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809 (1995). 
 75. For excellent discussions of the TRIPS negotiations, see generally DANIEL GERVAIS, 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 3–26 (2d ed. 2003) (describing 
the origins and development of the TRIPS Agreement); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL 
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oping countries to reform their intellectual property systems.  Of great re-
cent concern to the international community is the United States’ active 
push for the establishment of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade, in-
vestment, and intellectual property agreements, including the highly con-
troversial ACTA76 and the equally problematic Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP).77 
If experiences from countries like the United States—and, for that 
matter, Germany, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea—can be generalized, 
China will experience a crossover in the near future.  Indeed, one can al-
ready observe many similarities between the path taken by the United 
States in the nineteenth century and the path that the major developing 
countries are now taking.  While the United States went through three dif-
ferent stages of development—”from pirate to holdout to enforcer”78—
many developing countries have already experienced the first two stages.79  
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11–47 (2001) (recounting the 
negotiation process for the TRIPS Agreement); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 371–79 (2006) (examining four different accounts of the 
origins of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 76. For the Author’s criticisms of ACTA, see generally Yu, ACTA and Its Complex 
Politics, supra note 3; Yu, What Enforcement?, supra note 3; Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra 
note 3. 
 77. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited June 22, 2012) (providing up-to-date information about 
TPP).  See generally Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Para-
digm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27 (2011) (discussing 
TPP); Yu, Alphabet Soup, supra note 4 (explaining why TPP is likely to be more dangerous 
than ACTA from a public interest standpoint). 
 78. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 34 (2d 
ed. 2006); see also SAMUELS, supra note 34, at 230 (“The role of the United States in the 
international copyright community has gone from that of outlaws to outsiders to ‘strangers 
at the feast’ to leading members of the club.”). 
 79. As I wrote earlier: 
  When one examines the development paths of many former less-developed 
countries, one could identify three distinct stages of development: (1) isolation; 
(2) emergence; and (3) crossover.  The first stage began with the establishment of 
the international intellectual property regime.  For most countries, this stage ended 
when countries declared independence and entered into relations with other coun-
tries on their own volition.  The isolation stage lasted a little longer for those who 
relied on import substitution and similar strategies, such as those in the Com-
munist bloc and South America.  Unless there is a major setback to the interna-
tional legal order, such as a movement to abandon existing international treaties, 
this stage is over for virtually all countries today. 
  The second stage occurred when less-developed countries pushed for the estab-
lishment of the old development agenda in the 1960s and early 1970s, such as the 
revision of the Paris and Berne Conventions, the transformation of WIPO [World 
Intellectual Property Organization] into a specialised agency of the United Na-
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Thus, it is only a matter of time before China and other latecomers in the 
developing world reach a crossover point where stronger protection will be 
in their self-interests.80 
In sum, China will likely provide some good news to intellectual 
property rights holders.  After fighting hard for more than two decades and 
suffering considerable financial losses from piracy and counterfeiting, these 
rights holders and their supportive governments will finally begin to see the 
light at the end of the tunnel.  Nevertheless, as the next Part shows, the rap-
id and dramatic improvements in the intellectual property arena may bring 
some unintended consequences.  The United States and its intellectual 
property industries may therefore be in for a rude awakening.  While great-
er protection and enforcement will certainly provide some benefits, such 
improvements will also create an intellectual property power against which 
the United States may not be interested in competing. 
II.  UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Although the protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights in China is important, competition is not only about such protection 
and enforcement.81  In fact, as the British Commission on Intellectual Prop-
 
tions, and the establishment of the New International Economic Order.  Except for 
WIPO’s inclusion in the United Nations, most of these efforts ended with failure, 
due in no small part to the internal economic crises in these countries, the success-
ful divide-and-conquer strategies deployed by the United States and other devel-
oped countries, and the successful launch of the [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade]/WTO negotiations.  The ongoing development agendas also fit within 
this stage and could be considered a continuation of past pro-development efforts.  
At this point, however, it is premature to evaluate the success of these recent ef-
forts. 
  The last stage is where a less-developed country crosses over from a pirating 
nation to one that shows a strong respect for intellectual property rights.  This 
stage is set to begin for some high-income developing countries, such as Brazil, 
China and India.  It unfortunately will begin much later for low-income develop-
ing and least-developed countries.  Indeed, for countries with very low imitative 
capacity or an insufficiently developed market, sufficient empirical evidence has 
suggested that stronger intellectual property protection may not be in the best in-
terest of these countries. 
Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order, supra note 29, at 11–12 (footnote omitted). 
 80. See Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 
AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 391 (2008); Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 1, at 202. 
 81. As Jerome Reichman observed: 
[I]ntellectual property rights are but one component of overall economic growth; 
that different states have different factor endowments; and that in many countries, 
especially those at an early stage of development, a sound agricultural policy or a 
sound pro-competitive industrial policy with a supportive political and legal infra-
18
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss3/5
2012] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POWERS 543 
erty Rights rightly recognized, intellectual property rights should be re-
garded “as instruments of public policy which confer economic privileges 
on individuals or institutions solely for the purposes of contributing to the 
greater public good.”82  Because the conferred privileges should be “a 
means to an end, not an end in itself,”83 it is important for policymakers to 
focus on the broader picture of innovation and competition, as opposed to a 
narrower picture of intellectual property protection and enforcement.  Fo-
cusing on this broader picture, this Part discusses three potential unintended 
consequences caused by rapid and dramatic improvements in the Chinese 
intellectual property system: (1) an intellectual property litigation explosion 
in China; (2) the United States’ reduced competitive edge over China; and 
(3) the barriers to future intellectual property reform in the United States. 
A. Litigation Blowback 
For more than two decades, commentators have criticized China for its 
lack of respect for the rule of law and inadequately developed legal sys-
tem.84  Even though China has yet to respect the rule of law the same way 
as Western democracies, its legal system has greatly improved, especially 
after its accession to the WTO.85  Although much room for improvement 
still exists, and although most rights holders would rather see more litiga-
 
structure are more likely to stimulate economic growth than intellectual property 
laws. 
Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Develop-
ing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1117 (2009) [hereinafter Reichman, 
Twenty-First Century]. 
 82. COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 6 (2002) [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION REPORT].  Simi-
larly, Marco Ricolfi stated: 
A closer reading of TRIPs . . . shows that IP protection and enforcement are seen 
as means rather than ends in themselves both because the larger ends encompass 
freedom of trade . . . and because the international community is committed to 
taking into account other non-trade and non-IP factors while shaping IP protec-
tion. 
Marco Ricolfi, Is There an Antitrust Antidote Against IP Overprotection Within TRIPs?, 10 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 305, 326 (2006). 
 83. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 82, at 6. 
 84. For discussions of rule-of-law developments in China, see generally JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION (Randall 
Peerenboom ed., 2009); RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF 
LAW (2002); THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000). 
 85. See Shi Guangsheng, Introduction: Working Together for a Brighter Future Based 
on Mutual Benefit, in CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO 15, 15 (Henry Gao & Donald 
Lewis eds., 2005) (“After joining the WTO, China first and foremost sorted out over 2,300 
laws and regulations nationwide.”). 
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tion than less at this point in time, policymakers should begin thinking 
about what will happen if the volume of litigation continues to increase in 
China.  After all, while the United States has strong respect for the rule of 
law, commentators have heavily criticized the country for its litigious-
ness.86 
Moreover, when things happen in China, they tend to happen on a gi-
gantic scale.  This is true regardless of piracy and counterfeiting or intellec-
tual property litigation.  If insufficient safeguards are built into the legal 
system to prevent frivolous lawsuits and abuse of rights, the greater use of 
the legal system could eventually backfire on foreign rights holders.  For 
firms that manufacture all their goods in China, litigation-related disruption 
could be quite damaging.87  In fact, an injunction in China could easily re-
sult in the shutting down of all the production of a defendant firm. 
In an earlier work, I discussed how the challenge of Pfizer’s patent in 
sildenafil citrate, a key ingredient of Viagra, before SIPO in July 2003 por-
tended an emerging trend of growing litigiousness among Chinese firms.88  
Taking the opposite perspective, some commentators quickly classified this 
challenge as yet another attempt to pirate American intellectual property 
rights.  As a former director of policy planning at the USTR wrote: 
Faced with rising global pressure to crack down on patent infringement, 
Beijing may be in the process of redefining patent criteria effectively to 
safeguard Chinese drug-makers from accusations of illegal infringements.  
The removal of patents on Viagra or Avandia would offer Chinese compa-
nies free rein to manufacture homegrown copycat drugs without fear of 
prosecution.  If these cases continue in their current direction, China may in 
the process violate its obligations to the WTO. 
  For the global research pharmaceutical industry, the ruling carries the 
significant threat of a Chinese government tacitly supporting the production 
of counterfeit drugs by domestic Chinese companies.  For China’s trading 
partners worldwide, the ruling demonstrates China’s somewhat cautious 
embrace of the WTO’s rules-based system, which it joined in 2002.89 
 
 86. For discussions of litigiousness in American society, see generally JETHRO K. 
LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION 
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991). 
 87. See Wang Xiang, Partner, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Remarks at the 2012 
Asia Law Society Symposium, University of Michigan Law School (Mar. 24, 2012). 
 88. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 984–91 (discussing the chal-
lenge of Pfizer’s patent in sildenafil citrate before SIPO). 
 89. Naotaka Matsukata, China’s Counterfeit Commitment to Patents, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 
5, 2004, at 17; see also China’s Viagra Heist, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2004, at A16 (“The de-
cision in favor of a group of Chinese pharmaceutical companies who had petitioned the 
SIPO demonstrates a troubling pattern.  Although it is under international pressure to respect 
intellectual property rights, China is acceding to the demands of its own companies for pa-
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While it is not hard to understand the views expressed by those concerned 
about the SIPO challenge, especially Pfizer and other similarly situated for-
eign firms, their views overlooked the fact that the local challengers were 
actually relying on the legal process to invalidate the patent granted by 
SIPO. 
To be certain, the outcome was unfavorable to Pfizer (and likely many 
other foreign rights holders).  One could also debate about the appropriate 
legal basis for reviews granted by SIPO.  Nevertheless, it is hard to ignore 
the fact that the use of the SIPO process to invalidate a patent was exactly 
what intellectual property rights holders should expect in a country making 
a transition to become more respectful of intellectual property rights.  As 
Doug Clark, a noted intellectual property attorney formerly from Lovells, 
declared, “[A]s long as people are interested in dealing with commercial 
disputes through court, it is a sign that a country is developing a proper le-
gal system rather than ignoring it.”90 
A decade ago, local firms would simply ignore the law and manufac-
ture counterfeit products.  Many still do today.  This time, however, local 
firms went to SIPO first, asking for the invalidation of Pfizer’s patent for 
its failure to satisfy the novelty requirement.91  That was indeed an im-
provement. 
If this trend continues and accelerates, however, it may eventually 
lead to an unhealthy explosion of intellectual property challenges and liti-
gation.  Consider the patent area, for example.  While some challenges will 
undoubtedly be mounted as a result of the low or inconsistent quality of 
 
tent-nullification.”); Dudley Schleier, Pfizer Clarifies China’s Reversal of Viagra Patent, 
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 6, 2004, at 24 (maintaining that “China’s decision to overturn 
the Viagra patent . . . does indeed break new and unsettling legal ground . . . [and] sends a 
very disturbing message to all who are concerned about China’s commitment to intellectual 
property right”). 
 90. Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 986 n.394 (quoting Pfizer v. Chi-
na, RED HERRING, Aug. 26, 2004). 
 91. It is worth noting that the Viagra patent has also been invalidated in the United 
Kingdom and South America as well as by the European Patent Office.  See, e.g., Tony 
Chen, Western Ways, Good and Bad, FIN. TIMES (Asia), July 21, 2004, at 10 (providing a 
brief history of the development of Viagra and discussing the revocation of the Viagra pa-
tent in the United Kingdom and by the European Patent Office); Andy Ho, The Hoopla Over 
Viagra Patenting in China, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), July 14, 2004, at 16 (reporting the inval-
idation of the Viagra patent in the United Kingdom, Colombia, and Venezuela as well as by 
the European Patent Office); Phelim Kyne et al., China Voids Pfizer’s Viagra Patent, WALL 
ST. J., July 8, 2004, at A3 (reporting that “in 2001, the patent was disallowed in Bolivia, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela over a different issue”). 
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Chinese patents,92 other litigants may seek to test the boundaries of the in-
tellectual property system.  Some may even abuse the system, hoping to 
obtain opportunistic gains.  Eventually, the increased litigation in China 
may make it very costly for foreign rights holders or new local firms to en-
ter the market.  In fact, the growing volume of lawsuits in the country has 
already led some commentators to “wonder whether China is becoming a 
place where business disputes are resolved by rule of law or whether it is 
simply adopting a ‘bad’ habit of the west.”93 
At the macro-level, an explosion of intellectual property litigation in 
China can easily become a trade barrier.  This is particularly true when 
courts begin to grant high damage awards against foreign firms.  In the 
widely-reported 2006 case of Chint v. Schneider Electric, for example, the 
Wenzhou Intermediate People’s Court awarded the Chinese plaintiff dam-
ages of 330 million RMB (about $48 million) for infringement on a utility 
model patent.94  That case provided the largest damage award ever granted 
for patent infringement in China.  Although the case was eventually settled, 
it has caught considerable attention from foreign policymakers, firms, and 
commentators, due in part to the award’s unprecedented size and the fact 
that Schneider Electric was a foreign firm. 
Today, many intellectual property rights holders in China have already 
actively incorporated litigation into their business strategies.95  Commenta-
tors have also noted that China now has the world’s largest volume of intel-
lectual property litigation.96  As Chinese firms continue to buy intellectual 
 
 92. See generally Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality: Running the Numbers and Pos-
sible Remedies, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478 (2012) (questioning the quality 
of Chinese patents and offering suggestions for reform). 
 93. Chen, supra note 91. 
 94. For discussions of Chint v. Schneider Electric, see generally Wayne C. Jaeschke, Lu 
Zhun & Paul Crawford, Comparison of Chinese and U.S. Patent Reform Legislation: Which, 
If Either, Got It Right?, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 567, 576 (2012); Symposi-
um, Chinese Intellectual Property Judges Panel, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 61, 64–66 
(2011). 
 95. See Jameson Berkow, Patent Dragon Awakes, FIN. POST (Nov. 7, 2011, 6:39 PM), 
http://business.financialpost.com/2011/11/07/patent-dragon-awakes/.  As Mike Elmer, a 
senior counsel at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, explained: 
Historically, when we represented a Chinese company at Finnegan it was almost 
always as a defendant . . . .  But now, the Chinese are starting to develop their own 
portfolios, and these are defensive portfolios so if you get sued you can turn 
around and sue somebody else.  Ultimately, [their] game plan will become an of-
fensive one. 
Id. (quoting Elmer) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Chen, supra note 91 (“Intel-
lectual property disputes have . . . mushroomed.  Chinese companies are incorporating liti-
gation into their business strategy.  Over 9,000 lawsuits were filed in China in 2003.”). 
 96. As Xuan-Thao Nguyen documented: 
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property assets and foreign firms holding those assets,97 Chinese firms 
could initiate intellectual property litigation in not only China, but also 
throughout the world.  As a result, an intellectual property litigation explo-
sion in China could easily spread to other parts of the world. 
To some extent, one could tie the growing volume of Chinese intellec-
tual property lawsuits to the ongoing concern about patent trolls in the 
United States.98  If the patent troll problem takes place in China, the scale 
of the problem is likely to be very significant.  In fact, some commentators 
have already noted the difference between patent trolls in the United States 
and those found in China.  As Chris Bailey, Rouse’s deputy China country 
manager, observed, the term “patent cockroaches” better describes the 
smaller but more numerous patent trolls in China: 
  China doesn’t have patent trolls, it has patent cockroaches.  That’s not 
my name, but it is one that I’ve heard over here before.  It’s the perfect ex-
pression, really.  It describes an individual inventor or company that has a 
cheap utility model patent, probably invalid, which in many cases was 
probably invented during their time in another company.  They then assert 
 
In 2005, there were 12,159 patent, copyright, and trademark cases filed in the 
United States, compared to 10,825 cases in China.  In 2006, the United States saw 
11,486 cases, while China witnessed 11,436 intellectual property cases.  The trend 
continues, as demonstrated by the fact that the number of intellectual property 
cases filed in 2007 for the United States totaled 10,761, whereas China’s was 
15,159. 
Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: Revealing the New China’s Intellectual 
Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS L.J. 773, 775 (2011); see also Berkow, supra note 95 (“‘In 
Canada, you have maybe 60 patent infringement cases filed per year, maybe 80, and in the 
United States there are 3,000. . . .  China now has more than 3,000 . . . probably closer to 
4,000 now.’” (quoting Mike Elmer, Senior Counsel, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett 
& Dunner, LLP)); Doug Tsuruoka, Intellectual Property in China, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, 
Mar. 29, 2010, at A1 (stating that “Chinese courts heard more than 4,000 new cases in 2008 
vs. 2,800 for the U.S. and 200 for Japan” and reporting the description by Tony Chen, a 
partner in the Shanghai office of Jones Day, of China as “No. 1 in terms of patent infringe-
ment lawsuits between private parties”). 
 97. See SHAUN REIN, THE END OF CHEAP CHINA: ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL TRENDS 
THAT WILL DISRUPT THE WORLD 167 (2012) (“Chinese firms tend to acquire companies to 
buy brands for introduction into China, to cut the time needed for building brands, and to 
import technological know-how and management expertise.”); ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra 
note 6, at 139–40 (“[T]he Chinese are strategically acquiring companies that will help them 
overcome the impediments to winning market share in industries where cost innovation is 
difficult to exploit complementary local knowledge or technology”); id. at 140 (stating that 
China’s SGSB Group “acquired a strong brand, a wealth of customer relationships, and ad-
vance technology” through the acquisition of Duerkopp Adler, the German producer of in-
dustrial sewing machines); see also PETER NOLAN, IS CHINA BUYING THE WORLD? (2012) 
(critically examining the claim that “China is buying the world”). 
 98. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 1991, 2008–10 (2007) (discussing patent trolls). 
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this against, ideally, a foreign company or big corporation.  It should be 
remembered that it has cost them very little to attain this patent or to file, so 
even a damages award that is just a few thousand dollars is worth it for 
them, as the cost of litigation is also very low.99 
B. New Competitive Edge 
The TRIPS Agreement has been widely recognized as a strategic tool 
deployed by the United States, members of the European Communities, Ja-
pan, and other developed countries to protect their important interests in 
intellectual property–based goods and services.  As Ha-joon Chang pointed 
out in his attractively titled book, the rules in the existing international trad-
ing system have enabled developed countries to “kick away the ladder” 
needed by developing countries to catch up economically and technologi-
cally.100  Even today, many U.S. policymakers and firms subscribe to the 
view that strengthening intellectual property protection will be critically 
important to the success of those firms and the American economy. 
While this proposition has been true for most of the past two decades, 
it has become increasingly questionable today.  After all, intellectual prop-
erty protection has always been about striking an appropriate balance.  As 
Judge Alex Kozinski warned us in his famous dissent in White v. Samsung 
Electronics America, Inc., “Overprotecting intellectual property is as harm-
ful as underprotecting it.”101  Likewise, Josh Lerner wrote in a special issue 
of The WIPO Journal: “Almost all economists would agree that some intel-
lectual property protection is better than no intellectual property protection 
at all.  But this does not mean that very strong protection is better than a 
more moderate level of protection.”102 
To some extent, the push for China to strengthen intellectual property 
protection has resulted in the slow and paradoxical erosion of the United 
States’ competitive position.103  This point sounds counterintuitive, but it 
 
 99. NPEs, Chinese Style, IAM MAG. BLOG, http://www.iam-
magazine.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=6c5ae124-8052-40e3-873d-805cbb5d0e17 (last visited 
June 22, 2012) (quoting Chris Bailey, Rouse’s deputy China country manager). 
 100. HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (2002) (tracing the phrase to FREIDRICH LIST, THE NATIONAL 
SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 39 (Sampson Lloyd trans., 1885)). 
 101. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting). 
 102. Josh Lerner, The Patent System in a Time of Turmoil, 2 WIPO J. 28, 32 (2010); see 
also Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 13, 
17 (2006) (“More [copyright protection] is not always better, and small can be beautiful.”). 
 103. As I wrote earlier: 
It is no coincidence that many research and development (R & D) intensive indus-
tries remain located in the United States—and for that matter, other countries with 
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss3/5
2012] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POWERS 549 
actually makes a lot of sense.  From a long-term competition standpoint, 
greater intellectual property protection will make China more innovative 
and therefore more competitive.  Such increased competitiveness will slow-
ly erode the competitive advantage the United States has traditionally en-
joyed as a result of its much higher intellectual property standards. 
In fact, if all countries offer the same level of intellectual property pro-
tection and enforcement, other location factors will be determinative.  The-
se factors may include the size and growth of the market, and the costs of 
labor,104 transportation, and raw materials.105  As China offers stronger in-
 
a strong intellectual property system.  It is also worth noting that many researchers 
and highly educated people choose to stay in the country.  To some extent, weaker 
intellectual property protection abroad may have helped keep US jobs in the R & 
D intensive industries, especially amid the current global economic crisis.  
Stronger intellectual property protection and enforcement in China, therefore, is a 
double-edged sword: it can help and hurt the US economy at the same time. 
Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 12–13 (2010).  Similar-
ly, Jerome Reichman noted: 
[H]igh standards of protection that seem to lock in economic advantages today can 
turn against those who promoted them tomorrow.  When market power shifts and 
states having newly acquired economic capabilities arrive on domestic markets 
demanding respect for their internationally guaranteed proprietary rights, today’s 
maximalists could well find themselves hoisted on their own petards. 
J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a 
GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 747, 889 (1989); see also Amy Kapczynski, 
Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s 
Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1584 (2009) (“TRIPS may . . . have perverse 
implications for the multinational firms that advocated for it.  Although they aimed to push 
Indian competitors out of the low-value Indian market, they may have also pushed Indian 
companies into the U.S. and EU markets on which their profits much more substantially re-
ly.”); Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Asia: Implications for 
Australia, 37 AUSTRALIAN ECON. PAPERS 346, 358 (1998) (“One problem particularly facing 
small, open economies that already have comprehensive [intellectual property rights] in 
place is that as Asian systems become more protective their markets become relatively more 
attractive to foreign investors and licensors.”); Reichman, Twenty-First Century, supra note 
81, at 1119 (“[A]s often happens in international law, efforts to rig a regime for short-term 
advantages may turn out, in the medium- and long-term, to boomerang against those who 
pressed hardest for its adoption.”). 
 104. See REED E. HUNDT, IN CHINA’S SHADOW: THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 23 (2007) (“[T]heir sheer numerosity means that many Chinese entre-
preneurs can hire new employees at low wages for the indefinite future.”). 
 105. Examples of other location factors include local demand patterns, distance from 
markets, access to natural resources, trade protection, education and training of the local 
workforce, the condition of the financial sector, the health of the legal system, and the trans-
parency of governmental procedures.  See Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Ad-
dressing Information Distortion and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249, 
258–59 (2003); Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging 
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tellectual property protection, more American and multinational firms may 
consider relocating to China to take advantage of its lower production costs 
and considerable market potential.106  More technology will be transferred 
as a result, and more U.S. jobs—a key focus of the present administra-
tion—will be outsourced.107 
It is no coincidence that many research and development (R & D) in-
tensive industries remain located in the United States—and for that matter, 
other countries with a strong intellectual property system.  It is also worth 
noting that many researchers and highly educated individuals chose to stay 
in the country, due in large part to the high remuneration for their creative 
and inventive activities.108  In a perverse way, weaker intellectual property 
protection abroad may have helped keep U.S. jobs in the R & D intensive 
industries, especially amid the current global economic crisis.  Stronger in-
tellectual property protection and enforcement in China, therefore, is a 
double-edged sword:  it can help and hurt the U.S. economy at the same 
time. 
When I advance in conferences the argument that strengthening intel-
lectual property protection in China could result in more outsourcing or 
offshoring109 and thereby greater reduction of U.S. jobs, that argument of-
 
Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109, 123 
(1998). 
 106. See Peter K. Yu, Trade Barriers Won’t Contain China’s Cars, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 
25, 2007, at 15A; Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order, supra note 29, at 14 (“[I]f every-
thing (including intellectual property standards) is the same, what would prevent multina-
tional corporations from relocating their operations to countries that have drastically lower 
production, labour and distribution costs?”). 
 107. Some commentators, however, have pointed out that outsourcing to China will be 
less attractive in the future, due to the increased costs of living (and therefore costs of pro-
duction).  See REIN, supra note 97, at xiii (“Companies can no longer manufacture cheaply 
in China, and may need to rethink their strategies and shift manufacturing to lower-cost pro-
duction centers like Vietnam or Indonesia—or even back to the United States in some cas-
es.”).  But see id. at 26 (recounting the view of the president of a Shanghai furniture factory 
that “Chinese workers overall have more experienced line managers, and more drive and 
ability to produce more sophisticated products”). 
 108. See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 156 (1990); Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 
13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 173–76 (1994). 
 109. As Thomas Friedman explained: 
Offshoring . . . is different from outsourcing.  Outsourcing means taking some 
specific, but limited, function that your company was doing in-house—such as re-
search, call centers, or accounts receivable—and having another company perform 
that exact same function for you and then reintegrating their work back into your 
overall operation.  Offshoring, by contrast, is when a company takes one of its 
factories that it is operating in Canton, Ohio, and moves the whole factory off-
shore to Canton, China.  There, it produces the very same product in the very 
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ten invites responses claiming that the United States should engage in a 
race to the top, not a race to the bottom.  While aspiring to engage in a race 
to the top is correct, positive, and admirable, today’s major U.S. firms—or 
more correctly, multinational corporations—seem to be focusing more on 
their bottom line than on helping the country to engage in a race to the top.  
What is good for General Motors may not be good for America.  In fact, if 
firms continue to outsource or offshore in an effort to widen the profit mar-
gin, helping China strengthen intellectual property protection and enforce-
ment will certainly give the country a new competitive edge, assuming 
China can continue to maintain, on balance, its existing comparative ad-
vantages.110 
Even more problematic for U.S. policymakers, multinational firms 
have now been actively investing in R & D facilities in China.111  Despite 
 
same way, only with cheaper labor, lower taxes, subsidized energy, and lower 
health-care costs. 
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 114–15 (2005). 
 110. See ODED SHENKAR, COPYCATS: HOW SMART COMPANIES USE IMITATION TO GAIN A 
STRATEGIC EDGE 63 (2010) (“Globalization and outsourcing increase the number and diver-
sity of competitors while at the same time knowledge is becoming more codified and trans-
ferable.”); ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at 46 (“The rise of outsourcing in the global 
economy has clearly been an important factor in allowing Chinese companies to unlock the 
door to the global market at an early stage in their development.”).  Although the costs of 
living (and production) will certainly increase, see REIN, supra note 97, at xiii, the Chinese 
market still has not reached its full potential.  If this market continues to grow, the increase 
in market size may offset some of the location disadvantages brought about by increasing 
production costs. 
 111. As Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson wrote: 
[Since 1993], Motorola has built sixteen R&D centers with more than eighteen 
hundred people.  In 1999, Motorola set up its China Research Institute in Beijing, 
which is among the largest facilities of its type in China, and also a world-class 
center within Motorola.  Between 1985 and 2003, Motorola has applied for 2,305 
patents, making it among the biggest patent applicants in China. . . . 
  Recognizing that it needs to leverage Chinese advantages at every stage of the 
value chain in order to strengthen its global competitiveness, Korea’s LG group 
has gone even further, moving key R&D to China.  In 2005 LG hired two thou-
sand engineers and scientists into its Chinese R&D center, making it LG’s largest 
R&D site outside Korea.  LG has submitted more worldwide patent applications 
based on research conducted in China than any other company, with the exception 
for Huawei.  By placing such emphasis on China-based R&D, LG is tapping into 
the secrets of how to deliver high technology at low cost to strengthen and differ-
entiate its completive position against rivals such as Sony, Matsushita, and its 
archrival Samsung. 
ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at 178.  As they continued: 
[Since the mid-1990s, Intel] has built five plants in China, all using the latest 
technologies.  To tap into China’s distinctive technological developments, Intel 
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their repeated complaints about inadequate and ineffective intellectual 
property protection in China, these firms have also increased their efforts to 
secure intellectual property rights in that country.112  According to the 
World Bank, the volume of patent and trademark applications in 2010 by 
nonresidents amounted to 98,111113 and 67,838, respectively.114  These fig-
ures stand in sharp contrast to 22,478 and 39,633 in Australia, a country 
clearly more respectful of intellectual property rights.115  It is therefore no 
surprise that Reed Hundt, the former chairman of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, includes the following warning in his book In China’s 
Shadow: 
If the United States offshores technology leadership along with jobs and 
investment capital, the firms left behind will not necessarily find big win-
ners around which to cluster.  They will become more tentative.  They may 
not keep pace with Chinese technology development, or even obtain equal-
ly good service from Chinese technology sellers, as when California taught 
American business how to obtain the productivity gains of the 1990s.  The 
left-behind will struggle with the airline schedules to China and the lan-
guage and mores of the Chinese.  They may slow the pace of the invest-
ment and lose completive advantage in markets where foreigners can com-
pete against them.116 
C. Point of No Reversal 
Macroeconomic structures constantly change.  In the near future, the 
economic structure of the United States—and for that matter, members of 
the European Union, Japan, or other existing developed countries—could 
depend more on innovation than existing forms of intellectual property 
rights.  If firms like Apple, Google, and Facebook—as opposed to, say, the 
U.S. film and pharmaceutical industries—are driving the U.S. economy in 
 
Capital has invested in almost fifty companies in China and in 2005 it set up a 
$200 million Intel Capital China Technology Fund to take shares in promising 
technologies emerging there. 
Id. at 181. 
 112. See HUNDT, supra note 104, at 49–50 (“American firms fear theft of intellectual 
property in China.  Nonetheless, they routinely file for copyrights, trademarks, and patents 
in many countries.”); ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at 178 (describing the active filing 
of patent applications in China by Motorola and LG). 
 113. Patent Applications, Nonresident, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.PAT.NRES (last visited May 11, 2012). 
 114. Trademark Applications, Direct Nonresident, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.TMK.NRES (last visited May 11, 2012). 
 115. Patent Applications, Nonresident, supra note 113; Trademark Applications, Direct 
Nonresident, supra note 114. 
 116. HUNDT, supra note 104, at 50 (footnote omitted). 
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the future, one has to wonder how much the existing international intellec-
tual property system will still benefit the United States.117 
This point indeed came up during the discussion of ACTA.  One ma-
jor charge against this flawed and controversial plurilateral agreement is 
that, by locking in the existing high standards, the agreement may foreclose 
the opportunity for Congress to revise laws in the near future.  While Con-
gress can always ratchet up intellectual property standards, using the 
ACTA standards as the floor, the Agreement may prevent Congress from 
ratcheting down those high standards. 
Exemplifying this concern was the question Senator Ron Wyden 
raised in his letter to the USTR.118  In that letter, he questioned whether 
ACTA would lock the United States into the existing model under the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act119 (DMCA).  In response to his question, 
Ronald Kirk, the United States Trade Representative, wrote: “We envision 
that the provisions of the DMCA would be relevant to U.S. compliance 
with future ACTA obligations.  However, we are aware of concerns about 
retaining flexibility to legislate in the future in this field, and have written 
our proposals with those concerns in mind.”120 
Ambassador Kirk’s response is particularly telling, because it reveals 
the potential challenge in locking all the ACTA negotiating parties into the 
current high standards for intellectual property protection and enforcement 
while at the same time retaining flexibility and autonomy to allow each 
country to undertake future legislative reform that may lower the protection 
or create additional limitations and exceptions.121  That challenge becomes 
 
 117. As Christopher May wrote: 
[A]s the balance of technical leadership starts to move, perhaps accelerated by the 
impact of the recession on research and innovation in the most-developed coun-
tries (the US, Europe, and Japan), it is not clear that those states that previously 
argued for robust protection of [intellectual property rights] will necessarily find 
themselves so advantaged by the current settlement.  If the TRIPs agreement and 
the work of WIPO has largely in the past privileged the interests and benefits of 
the technological leaders in the global economy, what happens when this leader-
ship starts to shift? 
Christopher May, Afterword to IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 170, 172 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009). 
 118. See Letter from Ron Wyden, U.S. Senate, to Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Rep. (Jan. 6, 
2010). 
 119. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 120. Letter from Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Rep., to Ron Wyden, U.S. Senate (Jan. 28, 2010). 
 121. In fact, this concern is not only limited to ACTA.  It has been raised during the ne-
gotiation of other bilateral and regional free trade agreements.  As Senators Patrick Leahy 
and Arlen Specter reminded the USTR, “ACTA, if not drafted with sufficient flexibility, 
could limit Congress’s ability to make appropriate refinements to intellectual property law 
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even more important considering that limitations and exceptions have al-
ways been an integral part of the U.S. intellectual property system.122  They 
arguably have helped the United States achieve phenomenal success in de-
veloping innovative start-ups, including those in Silicon Valley and Route 
128.123 
Thus, as the structure of the U.S. economy continues to evolve, the 
country may need more flexibility and autonomy to adjust the levels of in-
tellectual property protection to those demanded by the local economy and 
innovative start-ups.  As these demands are increasingly made, the greater 
intellectual property protection in China and other developing countries 
pushed by the United States could ultimately come back to haunt U.S. poli-
cymakers.  Indeed, the exceedingly high protective standards adopted 
across the world and the related international commitments could make it 
difficult for the United States to roll back some of its existing protections. 
Ironically, some commentators have now questioned whether China in 
the future will become the champion of the existing maximalist system, 
which could suit China better than other developed countries.  The chang-
ing dynamics in the global economy and the improved technological capa-
 
in the future”—an institutional concern raised by the Senators earlier in relation to the im-
plementation of the United States–Peru Free Trade Agreement.  Letter from Patrick Leahy, 
Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary & Arlen Specter, Ranking Member, U.S. 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, to Susan C. Schwab, U.S. Trade Rep. (Oct. 2, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/senate-acta-letter-20081002.pdf; accord 
JANICE T. PILCH, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT 3 (Library Copyright Alli-
ance, Issue Brief, 2009), http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/ 
bm~doc/_issuebriefactafinalrev102609.pdf (“Intellectual property law is dynamic, constant-
ly being shaped by social and economic needs and technological advances.  A rigid plurilat-
eral system of enforcement could hinder the flexibility of the U.S., as well as other nations, 
to adapt their intellectual property laws to future needs and scenarios.”); Eddan Katz & 
Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement on the Knowledge 
Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for the Creation 
of IP Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 
ONLINE 24, 34 (1999) (“[U]sing an international agreement to lock in a particular interpreta-
tion of issues that are in dispute in U.S. courts precludes future policy options by creating 
foreign obligation barriers to domestic legislative reform.”). 
 122. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 138 (1996) (noting that exceptions and limita-
tions are “just as important as the grant of the right itself”); see also P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ 
& RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND 
EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT (2008), available at 
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/hugenholtz/ 
finalreport2008.pdf (providing an important study on limitations and exceptions). 
 123. YouTube provides a good example.  See generally Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright 
and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 897–99 (2011) (discussing the 
benefits of YouTube). 
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bilities in China therefore could result in a role reversal.124  In a recent arti-
cle, Jerome Reichman also questioned whether developing countries should 
still follow the developed countries’ lead in adopting their intellectual 
property system, as opposed to leading in the knowledge economy by 
building their own comparative advantages.125 
III.  POLICY OPTIONS 
The Previous Part identifies three unintended consequences brought 
about by the strengthening of intellectual property protection and enforce-
ment in China.  This Part suggests the policy changes needed to respond to 
the challenges caused by those unintended consequences.  Specifically, this 
Part discusses the need for adjustments to domestic, bilateral, and multilat-
eral policies.  Although this Part focuses on U.S. policies, it is important to 
note that a satisfactory response to the challenges identified in the Article 
will require more than unilateral action on the part of the United States. 
A. Domestic Policy 
In A Strategy for American Innovation, President Barack Obama out-
lined ways to “harness the inherent ingenuity of the American people to en-
sure that [the United States’] economic growth is rapid, broad-based, and 
sustained.”126  Although some people quickly, and arguably incorrectly, 
equate innovation and ingenuity with intellectual property protection and 
enforcement, the latter is not a prerequisite to achieving the President’s 
goals.  As commentators have repeatedly shown, one could promote crea-
tivity and innovation without pushing for broader and stronger intellectual 
 
 124. Thanks to Pedro Roffe for making this insightful observation. 
 125. See Reichman, Twenty-First Century, supra note 81, at 1126.  As Professor Reich-
man wrote: 
To the extent that intellectual property laws do play an ancillary but important 
role, there are, roughly speaking, two different approaches on the table.  One is to 
play it safe by sticking to time-tested IP solutions implemented in OECD [Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries, with perhaps a 
relatively greater emphasis on the flexibilities still permitted under TRIPS (and 
not overridden by relevant [free trade agreements]).  The other approach is to em-
bark on a more experimental path . . . that advanced technology countries current-
ly find so daunting. 
Id. 
 126. A Strategy for American Innovation: Securing Our Economic Growth and Prosperi-
ty, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/innovation/strategy (last visited May 11, 
2012). 
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property rights.127  In fact, if the push for broader and stronger rights leads 
to the development of an unbalanced intellectual property system, such ef-
fort could even stifle creativity and innovation.128 
In both the United States and other developed countries, policymakers 
have a tendency to assume that a push for stronger intellectual property 
protection and enforcement will always be in their country’s best interest.  
However, that assumption is not always valid.  Whether stronger protection 
will necessarily create a competitive edge depends largely on whether such 
protection will actually drive innovation and economic development. 
As China continues to push for an annual filing of millions of patents, 
and as it obtains more intellectual property assets from abroad, U.S. poli-
cymakers need to question whether a focus on greater protection will al-
ways be in their country’s best interest.  They also need to think more about 
the changing nature of the increasingly knowledge-based economy.  For 
instance, an economy that is dependent on Apple, Google, and Facebook 
will likely need a very different intellectual property system than an econ-
omy relying on Paramount Pictures, Time Warner, and Viacom. 
Moreover, commentators have widely noted that the protection of in-
tellectual property rights is only a means to an end.  If the country’s end 
goal is to maintain a competitive edge over its major trading partners, poli-
cymakers may be better off focusing on other issues, such as education and 
innovation.  Indeed, in the wake of the global economic crisis, many com-
 
 127. See BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra note 6, at 4 (“[I]n an era of fragmented produc-
tion in which each country specializes not only in specific industries but also in specific 
stages of production, and in which truly novel products are produced or sourced globally 
without being produced in the counties where they are developed, there are many modes of 
innovation that contribute to sustainable long-term economic growth.”).  For discussions of 
alternative innovation models, see generally INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: 
PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 133–283 (Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 
2010) (collecting articles discussing prizes, patent pools, and open source drug discovery); 
GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, 
OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009) (collect-
ing articles discussing patent pools, clearinghouses, open source models, and liability re-
gimes); UMA SUTHERSANEN ET AL., INNOVATION WITHOUT PATENTS: HARNESSING THE 
CREATIVE SPIRIT IN A DIVERSE WORLD (2007) (exploring the extent to which innovations 
should or should not be protected as intellectual property). 
 128. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN 
A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (lamenting how the recent expansion of intellectual property 
laws have stifled creativity and innovation); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 40 (describing 
how the increasing corporate control over the use of software, digital music, images, films, 
books, and academic materials has steered copyright law away from its historical design to 
promote creativity and cultural vibrancy). 
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mentators have emphasized the urgent need for policymakers to focus at-
tention on these issues.129 
In recent literature, commentators questioned the appropriateness of 
funding cuts in both education130 and R & D at a time when the country 
needs to become more competitive.131  They also lamented the reduced ac-
ademic performance of American students vis-à-vis students from other 
parts of the world, including China.132  In fact, educational reform is so crit-
ically important that Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum wrote in 
their new book that, when President Obama offered Hilary Clinton the Sec-
retary of State position, she should have declined and responded: “To-
day . . . more than ever before, our national security depends on the quality 
 
 129. See, e.g., NATIONAL SUMMIT ON COMPETITIVENESS, STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL 
SUMMIT ON COMPETITIVENESS: INVESTING IN U.S. INNOVATION (2005), available at 
http://oregonmanufacturing.org/files/NAM_Investing_in_Innovation.pdf (calling for efforts 
to “revitalize fundamental research,” “expand the innovation talent pool in the United 
States,” and “lead the world in the development and deployment of advanced technolo-
gies”); ANN LEE, WHAT THE U.S. CAN LEARN FROM CHINA: AN OPEN-MINDED GUIDE TO 
TREATING OUR GREATEST COMPETITOR AS OUR GREATEST TEACHER 5 (2012) (calling Amer-
ica to “revive education,” “reinvest in infrastructure” and “remain focused on competive-
ness”). 
 130. As Reed Hundt lamented: 
  Even while all commentators identified educational reform as the source of 
new competitive energy to meet rising Asia, the [Bush] administration selected re-
ligion and standardized testing as the two most important topics in education.  
Prayer in school had nothing to do with responding to global competition.  Testing 
could diagnose performance problems but in no way could remedy them.  Mean-
while the administration failed to fund fully its own education law.  It cut back 
public funds for college education.  It discouraged American academies from re-
cruiting the best students in other countries. 
HUNDT, supra note 104, at 81. 
 131. See id. at 91 (“Total spending on research and development adjusted for inflation 
fell slightly every year.  Federal spending on basic research in math and physical sciences 
has declined as a percentage of GDP since the 1980s, while federal spending on research 
and development for life sciences has gone up.” (footnote omitted)). 
 132. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO BE US: HOW 
AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND HOW WE CAN COME BACK 103 
(2011) (“[W]e have an equally dangerous gap between the average American student and 
the average students in many industrial countries that we consider collaborators and compet-
itors, including Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Finland, and those in the most developed parts of 
China.”); HUNDT, supra note 104, at 48 (“The percentages of American students in mathe-
matics and science decline steadily from the freshman year of college through the level of 
post-doctoral programs.  Foreigners fill the spots in such programs.”); JEFFREY SACHS, THE 
PRICE OF CIVILIZATION: REAWAKENING AMERICAN VIRTUE AND PROSPERITY 19 (2011) (“The 
quality of the labor force will be the most important single determinant of American pros-
perity in the decades to come.  The evidence, therefore, that America’s public schools are 
falling behind those of the rest of the world in core attainments in reading, science, and math 
is a harbinger of a deepening crisis.”). 
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of our educational system.  That is why I don’t want to be secretary of 
state, Mr. President.  Instead, I want to be at the heart of the national securi-
ty policy.  I want to be secretary of education.”133  As these authors rea-
soned, drawing on their deep background knowledge of American politics: 
We don’t think of education as an investment in national growth and na-
tional security because throughout our history it has been a localized, de-
centralized issue, not a national one.  Today, however, what matters is not 
how your local school ranks in its country or state but how America’s 
schools rank in the world.134 
Like education, commentators are also very concerned about the coun-
try’s reduced output in R & D.135  As Friedman and Mandelbaum contin-
ued: “At a time when the pace of change in the global economy and the ris-
ing economic importance of knowledge make increasing investment in 
research and development an urgent priority, our spending in this vital area 
 
 133. FRIEDMAN & MANDELBAUM, supra note 132, at 100. 
 134. Id. at 100–01.  In the book, the authors quoted a frank assessment of the U.S. educa-
tion system by Michelle Rhee, the former chancellor of District of Columbia public schools: 
This country is in a significant crisis in education, and we don’t know it.  If you 
look at other countries, like Singapore—Singapore’s knocking it out of the box.  
Why?  Because the number-one strategy in their economic plan is education. 
  We treat education as a social issue.  And I’ll tell you what happens with social 
issues:  When the budget crunch comes, they get swept under the rug, they get 
pushed aside. 
  We have to start treating education as an economic issue.  We need America to 
become number one again, and the one thing that can drive us toward that is com-
petition. 
Harry Jaffe, The Education of Michelle Rhee, WASHINGTONIAN (Nov. 29, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/the-education-of-michelle-rhee/. 
 135. As Reed Hundt observed: 
  According to a task force composed of technology companies, by 2005 the 
American lead in research and discovery was “eroding rapidly as other countries 
commit significant resources to enhance” the capacity of their citizens and firms 
to compete with the United States.  The American share of scientific papers and 
patents is declining.  American citizens authored only about half the industrial pa-
tents sought in the United States in 2004, and less than a third of the articles in 
Physical Review, a physics journal.  Fewer Americans choose to study basic 
mathematics and science than in the past.  In graduate science and mathematics 
American enrollment is dropping.  The number of science and engineering doctor-
ates granted to American citizens at American universities fell about 12 percent 
from 1998 to 2002. 
HUNDT, supra note 104, at 91 (footnotes omitted); see also SACHS, supra note 132, at 19 
(“Intellectual capital . . . is also diminishing, as America ceded technological leadership to 
China and other countries in areas such as renewable energy and stem cell research.”). 
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is actually declining.”136  In a colorful list, they laid down an interesting set 
of metrics to show the country’s upcoming challenges: 
  In 2009 United States consumers spent significantly more on potato 
chips than the government devoted to energy research and development—
$7.1 billion versus $5.1 billion. 
  China is now second in the world in its publication of biomedical re-
search articles, having recently surpassed Japan, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Italy, France, Canada, and Spain. 
. . . . 
  Federal funding of research in the physical sciences as a fraction of 
GDP fell by 54 percent in the twenty-five years after 1970.  The decline in 
engineering funding was 51 percent. 
. . . . 
  The total annual federal investment in research in mathematics, the 
physical sciences, and engineering is now equal to the increase in U.S. 
health-care costs every nine weeks. 
  China’s Tsinghua and Peking Universities are the two largest suppliers 
of students who receive Ph.D.s—in the United States.137 
Interestingly—and disturbingly for U.S. policymakers—while the 
U.S. administration has been pushing for severe funding cuts in education 
and research, China has been doing just the exact opposite.  For instance, 
China is now actively increasing opportunities for university education, in-
cluding in the areas of science, engineering, mathematics, technology, and 
medicine.138  The country has also dedicated considerable effort to expand-
ing R & D capabilities.139  To some extent, such dedicated efforts provide a 
 
 136. FRIEDMAN & MANDELBAUM, supra note 132, at 230. 
 137. Id. at 232. 
 138. See JOHN NAISBITT & DORIS NAISBITT, CHINA’S MEGATRENDS: THE 8 PILLARS OF A 
NEW SOCIETY 165 (2010).  As John and Doris Naisbitt noted: 
Since 1979, more than 1 million Chinese have studied in more than 100 countries, 
and nearly 300,000 have returned home after finishing their studies.  The number 
of foreign students in China has also increased rapidly.  Since 1979, more than 1 
million students from 188 countries have studied at 544 Chinese universities. 
Id.; see also ORCUTT & SHEN, supra note 6, at 46 (“[E]ven if China is graduating only 750 
000+ science and engineering undergraduates each year, that number is still 50% greater 
than the United States’ annual output of roughly 500 000 science and engineering under-
graduates.”). 
 139. For example, Martin Jacques wrote: 
China is already the fifth leading nation in terms of its share of the world’s leading 
scientific publications and it is particularly strong in certain key areas like nano-
technology.  In 2006, according to the OECD, China overtook Japan to become 
the world’s second largest R&D investor after the US.  With 6.5 million under-
graduates and 0.5 million postgraduates studying science, engineering and medi-
35
Yu: The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2012
560 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:525 
late, but timely renewal of the millennia-long Chinese tradition of educa-
tion and scientific development.140 
At the commercial level, China has also actively assumed new roles 
that go beyond what it took up in the past two decades.  Although China 
has served as an original equipment manufacturer and the world’s factory 
for shoes, clothes, toys, household products, and low-cost electronic goods, 
it is now “moving rapidly to dominate global markets, not just for labor-
 
cine, China already has the world’s largest scientific workforce.  In 2003 and 2005 
it successfully carried out two manned space missions, while in 2007 it managed 
to destroy one of its own satellites with a ballistic missile, thereby announcing the 
intention of competing with the United States of military supremacy in space.  In 
due course, it seems highly likely that China will emerge as a major global force 
in science and technology. 
MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD AND 
THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER 385–86 (2009).  Niall Ferguson concurred: 
China has increased expenditure on research and development by a factor of six in 
the past decade, has more than doubled the number of its scientists and is now se-
cond only to the United States in its annual output of scientific papers and its su-
percomputing capability.  There remains a significant gap in terms of international 
citations of Chinese research, but there is good reason to expect this to close. 
NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST 318 (2011).  Aaron Friedberg al-
so noted: 
Since the mid-1990s, the government has put its money where its mouth is.  Total 
national spending on research and development has grown even faster than the 
economy as a whole, increasing its share of GDP from around .3 percent in 1998 
to 1.34 percent in 2005, with a goal of reaching 2.5 percent by 2020.  Other “in-
puts” to the innovation process have increased as well, including the numbers of 
scientists and engineers engaged in R&D in China, students enrolled in college 
and graduate school, and those receiving doctoral degrees in science and engineer-
ing fields. 
AARON L. FRIEDBERG, A CONTEST FOR SUPREMACY: CHINA, AMERICA, AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR MASTERY IN ASIA 234 (2011).  John Orcutt and Shen Hong further observed: 
From 2000 to 2006, China almost tripled its output of science and engineering 
PhDs and more than quadrupled its output of science and engineering masters’ 
degrees.  Some have predicted that China will have more science and engineering 
PhDs in the United States by 2010.  In 2006, China graduated more science and 
engineering PhDs, which compares favorably to the United States’ issuance of just 
under 16 000 PhDs in physical sciences and engineering in 2007. 
ORCUTT & SHEN, supra note 6, at 46–47 (citation omitted). 
 140. Joseph Needham’s lifelong work on his series of books entitled Science and Civili-
sation in China provides a good starting point for studying Chinese scientific developments.  
See, e.g., JOSEPH NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA. VOLUME 1: 
INTRODUCTORY ORIENTATIONS (1956).  See also BENJAMIN A. ELMAN, ON THEIR OWN 
TERMS: SCIENCE IN CHINA, 1550–1900 (2005) (discussing the scientific developments in 
China in the Ming and Qing dynasties); ROBERT TEMPLE, THE GENIUS OF CHINA: 3,000 
YEARS OF SCIENCE, DISCOVERY, AND INVENTION (2007) (discussing three millennia of sci-
ence, discoveries, and inventions in China). 
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intensive manufactured goods, but also technologically more advanced 
products.”141  As the country becomes a more dominant player in the global 
marketplace, the economic challenge it presents to the United States and 
other developed economies is likely to become more severe. 
In sum, the economic and technological competition between China 
and the United States can only become steeper in the near future.  It is time 
U.S. policymakers reassess their priorities in the areas of education and R 
& D.  Indeed, when this point was presented in conferences, including this 
Symposium, many audience members could not help but nod in agreement.  
Perhaps they were nodding because they were members of the academic 
and research communities.  But perhaps they were also nodding because 
they foresaw the United States’ upcoming challenge to compete with Chi-
na, yet was disappointed by the administration’s reluctance to invest in 
promoting the country’s competitiveness. 
B. Bilateral Policy 
In the intellectual property arena, both policymakers and the main-
stream media in the United States have a tendency to focus on piracy and 
counterfeiting in China.  While those activities continue to harm U.S. rights 
holders and deserve our policy attention, the picture of intellectual property 
developments in China has become increasingly complex.  In fact, U.S. 
policymakers can no longer ignore China’s emergence as an intellectual 
property power.  They need to consider China not as what they want it to 
be, but what it actually is or what it will become. 
As Bruce Lehman, the former commissioner of the United States Pa-
tent and Trademark Office, rightly reminded the International Trade Com-
mission during a public hearing on the impact of intellectual property in-
 
 141. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD NEEDS 
TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 99 (2006); see also Dominic Barton, 
Foreword to LIEBERTHAL, supra note 29, at ix (“No longer can it be said that China is only a 
source of low-cost manufactured goods, exporting a ‘China price’ to the world; many lead-
ing Chinese businesses are rapidly moving up the value chain on the back of home-market 
demand to challenge the historic global leaders.”); Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not 
Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 203, 208 (2006) (“China’s ambi-
tions are vast: China seeks to maintain its dominance in labor-intensive sectors, to gain and 
maintain dominance in low-technology sectors, and to eventually dominate trade in high-
technology sectors.”); Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 392 (“Although 
China today is considered the world’s manufacturing capital, producing shoes, clothes, toys, 
household products, and low-cost electronic goods, the country eventually will move into 
the world’s high-end market while continuing to dominate its low-end market.”); Pete 
Engardio, Introduction to CHINDIA: HOW CHINA AND INDIA ARE REVOLUTIONIZING 
GLOBAL BUSINESS 4 (Pete Engardio ed., 2006) (“The idea that China will continue to as-
semble low-end products while high-end manufacturing will always remain in advanced 
countries . . . is becoming outdated.”). 
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fringement and indigenous innovation policies in China on the U.S. econ-
omy: 
  China is emerging as a technological power, graduating significantly 
more scientists and engineers than the United States.  Its population of In-
ternet users has become the largest in the world.  I expect that in coming 
decades China will have a robust system of intellectual property rights pro-
tection and enforcement appropriate to a tech-based economy.  Unfortu-
nately, that may come too late for U.S. industry.  Having sheltered its own 
market while developing competitive [intellectual property] based products 
and services, China will then be in a position to assert a comparative ad-
vantage, based not only on cheap labor and currency manipulation, but in 
the very areas of comparative market advantage that we in the U.S. had en-
visioned in the 1990s when we negotiated what we thought will be a fair 
and balanced trading relationship.142 
In Lehman’s view, the United States should take advantage of the present 
window when it still has a comparative edge over China in both the techno-
logical sector and intellectual property–based goods and services.  It will be 
too late if China is able to close that window and catch up with the United 
States. 
Thus far, the U.S. foreign intellectual property strategy has focused 
mostly on pushing China to strengthen intellectual property protection and 
enforcement.  However, it is time policymakers think more about the unin-
tended consequences of such a focus—for example, how strengthening in-
tellectual property protection and enforcement could provide China with a 
new competitive edge.  It is also important for them to consider the risks 
involved in betting on a world intellectual property order that assumes that 
the United States will always benefit from broader and stronger intellectual 
property rights, as opposed to having a more moderate level of protection 
that benefits innovation. 
In fact, commentators have begun to point out the danger of having an 
obsession with intellectual property enforcement.  As Dan Chow pointed 
out, such obsession has now backfired on rights holders by making piracy 
and counterfeiting problems in China more difficult to tackle: 
Multi-national companies (MNCs) have adopted a flawed approach to 
combating trademark counterfeiting in China that is actually making the 
problem worse, inciting a frenzy of counterfeiting at all-time new world 
highs in China.  This approach places primary emphasis on enforcement, 
 
 142. Written Statement of Bruce A. Lehman, President, International Intellectual Proper-
ty Institute, Before the U.S. International Trade Commission (June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/testimony/332_514_003.pdf (emphasis added).  
The Author of this Article also testified in this public hearing.  See Yu, ACTA and Its Com-
plex Politics, supra note 3, at 6–13 (expanding the ideas articulated in the Author’s oral tes-
timony). 
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that is, raids on factories and warehouses used by counterfeiters, destruc-
tion of equipment, and confiscation and seizures of counterfeit prod-
ucts. . . .  As any brand owner in China knows, it is possible to obtain an 
enforcement action in the form of a surprise raid within minutes of an in-
person application before the enforcement authorities.  However, as brand 
owners in China also know, enforcement does not result in any serious con-
sequences for the counterfeiter; to the contrary, the consequences of being 
caught as a counterfeiter are usually so insignificant that such consequences 
can be considered just a cost of doing business.  As a result, a strategy that 
focuses primarily on enforcement in a legal system and that does not create 
effective deterrence actually has the unintended, even opposite effect, of 
angering counterfeiters and provoking them to engage in even more illegal 
activity.  Indeed, what some MNCs have discovered is that the more en-
forcement they conduct, the more their products are being counterfeited.143 
C. Multilateral Policy 
There is no doubt China will become more assertive in the interna-
tional intellectual property regime as it becomes more powerful and tech-
nologically proficient.  After more than a decade of experience with the 
WTO and more than two decades of rapid and sustained economic growth, 
it is understandable why China wants to join Brazil and India as the leaders 
of the developing world.144  Although China has intentionally kept a low 
profile on international intellectual property matters, it now has strategical-
ly positioned itself as a norm maker, in addition to being a norm taker.145 
Part I shows that China will experience dramatic improvements in in-
tellectual property protection as it crosses over from the less promising side 
of the intellectual property divide to the more promising one.  It remains 
unclear, however, whether China will be interested in retaining the existing 
international intellectual property system.  In fact, there is a good chance 
that new intellectual property powers may want to develop something dif-
ferent—something that builds on their historical traditions and cultural 
backgrounds and something that takes account of their drastically different 
socio-economic conditions.146 
 
 143. Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies in Chi-
na: How a Flawed Approach Is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749, 750 
(2010). 
 144. See Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 1. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Yu, Global Intellectual Property Order, supra note 29, at 15 (“Although there 
has been wide disagreement over where the balance should be struck, the future standards 
are likely to fall somewhere in the middle—between what developed countries desire and 
what less-developed countries can afford.”). 
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If the intellectual property positions of China and the United States 
represent two ends of a spectrum, the intellectual property system they 
shape is likely to be somewhere in the middle between the two.147  Depend-
ing on the strength of each power, and its ability to form alliances with oth-
er members of the international community, the system will likely swing 
back and forth between the two ends.  Indeed, as Martin Jacques observed, 
“In the long term . . . China is likely to operate both within and outside the 
existing international system, seeking to transform that system while at the 
same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system 
which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to 
usurp it.”148 
As excited as policymakers are about the developments in China, they 
should also pay greater attention to the growing emergence of India as both 
an economic and intellectual property power.149  Like China, India is one of 
the widely-discussed BRICs countries, providing a large and fast-growing 
market.150  As Goldman Sachs analysts have stated, “India has the potential 
to show the fastest growth over the next 30 and 50 years,” and its “econo-
my could be larger than all but the US and China in 30 years.”151  In fact, 
 
 147. As I explained earlier: 
Although some commentators have argued that less-developed countries will 
eventually make a transition to become developed countries, it is premature to as-
sume that less-developed countries, once developed, will always want the existing 
international intellectual property system.  There is a good chance that they may 
want or need something rather different! 
Id. at 15; see also JACQUES, supra note 139, at 178 (“However difficult and different the cir-
cumstances China faces, it is already busy inventing its own path of development, as Britain 
did as the pioneer country, the United States as the inventor of mass production, and Japan 
as the innovator of a new kind of just-in-time production.”). 
 148. JACQUES, supra note 139, at 362. 
 149. Indeed, China and India are so important that many commentators have discussed 
these two countries together.  See CHINDIA, supra note 141; ROBYN MEREDITH, THE 
ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON: THE RISE OF INDIA AND CHINA AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL 
OF US (2007).  As Martin Jacques observed: 
China and India have much in common.  They are both hugely populous coun-
tries, demographic superpowers, which are in the process of dramatic economic 
information.  Between them they account for almost 40 percent of the world’s 
population.  They are both continental giants, China a dominating presence in East 
Asia and India similarly in South Asia.  By the mid twenty-first century they 
could both be major global powers. 
JACQUES, supra note 139, at 338. 
 150. See generally JIM O’NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE 
BRICS AND BEYOND 69–79 (2011) (discussing the growth potential of India). 
 151. Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 
2050, at 4 (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99), available at 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf. 
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some analysts have already predicted that India will eventually overtake 
China in the latter half of the twenty-first century.152  India is also a 
longstanding leader of the developing world, along with Brazil.153  Alt-
hough commentators have questioned whether Brazil and India could still 
assert their leadership in the intellectual property arena as they did in the 
past,154 it is fair to say that the United States’ relationship with India will 
figure largely in future macro-level intellectual property policies. 
Also of great importance is the recent emergence of the African 
Group.155  For example, Zimbabwe, with one of its nationals serving as the 
chair of the TRIPS Council at the time of the Doha Declaration,156 was in-
strumental in pushing for the adoption of that declaration.157  Tanzania has 
also been active in pushing for the development of a new article 29bis of 
 
 152. See MEREDITH, supra note 149, at 57 (“‘China is winning the sprint, and [India is] 
going to win the marathon.’” (quoting Kamal Nath, India’s minister of commerce and indus-
try)); Pete Engardio, Why India May Be Destined to Overtake China, in CHINDIA, supra 
note 141, at 27 (noting that India may eventually become a stronger economic power than 
China, due to its growth in workforce, fixed investment, and productivity); Huang Yasheng 
& Tarun Khanna, Can India Overtake China?, FOREIGN POL’Y, July/Aug. 2003, at 74, 81 
(“China and India have pursued radically different development strategies.  India is not out-
performing China overall but it is doing better in certain key areas.  That success may ena-
ble it to catch up with and perhaps even overtake China.”).  But see MEREDITH, supra note 
149, at 154 (“China has proved so much more efficient than India at development and man-
aging its economy that th[e] scenario [that India’s economy will overtake China’s] is unlike-
ly unless China falls into political turmoil.”). 
 153. See Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 
AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 349–50 (2008). 
 154. See Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property 
Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 765 (2002) (questioning whether “India 
and Brazil are prepared to provide the general leadership on intellectual property issues that 
they once did”). 
 155. See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND 
THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 123 
(2009) (noting the increased assertiveness of the African Group). 
 156. Zimbabwean Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku chaired the Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in its formal meeting on June 18–22, 2001.  
WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT (2001) OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRIPS (2001).  He also 
“requested a special TRIPS Council session on access to medicines.”  Susan K. Sell, TRIPS 
and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481, 512 (2002). 
 157. See Sangeeta Shashikant, The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: An 
Impetus for Access to Medicines, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 141, 146 (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (“Zimbabwe, on be-
half of the Africa Group, proposed that the Doha Ministerial Conference to be convened 
later in the same year issue a special declaration to affirm a common understanding that the 
TRIPS Agreement does not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health 
. . . .”). 
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the TRIPS Agreement.158  That new provision would create an obligation to 
disclose in patent applications the source of origin of the biological re-
sources and traditional knowledge used in patent-seeking inventions.159  If 
the importance of the African Group grows, U.S. policymakers will need to 
think more about China’s ongoing engagement with African countries.160 
In many of these countries, the Beijing Consensus161 has now been 
touted as a desirable alternative to the Washington Consensus,162 which the 
 
 158. See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Peru, 
Thailand and Tanzania, Doha Work Programme—The Outstanding Implementation Issue 
on the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Di-
versity, WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5, 2006). 
 159. See id. ¶ 2 (requiring patent applicants to “disclose the country providing the re-
sources and/or associated traditional knowledge, from whom in the providing country they 
were obtained, and, as known after reasonable inquiry, the country of origin”). 
 160. See, e.g., AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA (Firoze Manji & Stephen 
Marks eds., 2007) [hereinafter AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES]; CHRIS ALDEN, CHINA IN AFRICA: 
PARTNER, COMPETITOR OR HEGEMON? (2007); DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: 
THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA (2011); HARRY G. BROADMAN, AFRICA’S SILK ROAD: 
CHINA AND INDIA’S NEW ECONOMIC FRONTIER (2007); PÁDRAIG CARMODY, THE NEW 
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (2011); CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: BEIJING’S STRATEGY 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Joshua Eisenman et al. eds., 2007); CHINA INTO AFRICA: 
TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2008); CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: A 
RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT EMBRACE (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008); CHINA’S NEW 
ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH: A SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE (Dorothy-Grace Guer-
rero & Firoze Manji eds., 2008); IAN TAYLOR, CHINA AND AFRICA: ENGAGEMENT AND 
COMPROMISE (2006); IAN TAYLOR, CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA (2008); THE RISE OF 
CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS 
(Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi eds., 2010). 
 161. Joshua Ramo, the former Time foreign editor, coined the term “Beijing Consensus.”  
JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 4 (2004), available at 
http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf.  As he explained: 
[The Beijing Consensus] is simply three theorems about how to organise the place 
of a developing country in the world, along with a couple of axioms about why the 
physics is attracting students in places like New Delhi and Brasilia.  The first the-
orem repositions the value of innovation.  Rather than the “old-physics” argument 
that developing countries must start development with trailing-edge technology 
(copper wires), it insists that on the necessity of bleeding-edge innovation (fiber 
optic) to create change that moves faster than the problems change creates.  In 
physics terms, it is about using innovation to reduce the friction-losses of reform. 
  The second Beijing Consensus theorem is that since chaos is impossible to 
control from the top you need a whole set of new tools.  It looks beyond measures 
like per-capita GDP and focuses instead of quality-of-life, the only way to manage 
the massive contradictions of Chinese development.  This second theorem de-
mands a development model where sustainability and equality become first con-
siderations, not luxuries.  Because Chinese society is an unstable stew of hope, 
ambition, fear, misinformation and politics only this kind of chaos-theory can 
provide meaningful organization. 
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recent financial crisis has largely discredited.163  The Chinese development 
model has also earned great admiration among countries throughout the 
developing world.  In recent years, for example, “[g]overnment research 
teams from Iran to Egypt, Angola to Zambia, Kazakhstan to Russia, India 
to Vietnam and Brazil to Venezuela have been crawling around the Chinese 
cities and countryside in search of lessons from Beijing’s experience.”164 
Indeed, African analysts appreciate that “China understands the chal-
lenges of governing in areas where the bulk of the population lives in abject 
poverty.”165  While the Chinese model may not promote democratic society 
and civil liberties—the conditions U.S. policymakers often demand—that 
model shows the Chinese leaders’ pragmatic approach and willingness to 
consider a wide variety of options.166  As Deborah Brautigam reminded us: 
At the end of the day, we should remember this: China’s own experiments 
have raised hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty, largely without 
 
  Finally, the Beijing Consensus contains a theory of self-determination, one that 
stresses using leverage to move big, hegemonic powers that may be tempted to 
tread on your toes. 
Id. at 11–12.  For discussions of the Beijing Consensus, see generally id.; STEFAN A. 
HALPER, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010). 
 162. John Williamson, an economist and a senior fellow of the Institute for International 
Economics, coined the term “Washington Consensus.”  John Williamson, What Washington 
Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 
7–20 (John Williamson ed., 1990).  The Washington Consensus was derived from recom-
mendations in ten different areas: (1) fiscal deficits; (2) public expenditure priorities; (3) tax 
reform; (4) interest rates; (5) the exchange rate; (6) trade policy; (7) foreign direct invest-
ment; (8) privatization; (9) deregulation; and (10) property rights.  Id. 
 163. See Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 1018–22 
(2011) (discussing the battle between the Beijing Consensus and the Washington Consen-
sus). 
 164. MARK LEONARD, WHAT DOES CHINA THINK? 122 (2008); see also HALPER, supra 
note 161, at 31 (noting “a growing number of developing nations that are loosely connected 
by an admiration for China”); Stephen Marks, Introduction to AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 160, at 1, 11 (citing Nigerians’ appreciation of the Chinese model for providing stabil-
ity and visionary leadership). 
 165. Hany Besada, The Implications of China’s Ascendancy for Africa 24 (Ctr. for Int’l 
Governance Innovation, Working Paper No. 40, 2008), available at 
http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Paper_40-web.pdf. 
 166. See WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, ASIA, AMERICA, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
GEOPOLITICS 118 (2007).  As William Overholt explained: 
Chinese leaders . . . do not accept Western democratic ideology, but they accept 
individual practices, such as village elections, because those practices have specif-
ic pragmatic value in reducing corruption.  They want to discover and test these 
things themselves, step by step, rather than succumb to foreign ideological brow-
beating, but they are willing to consider nearly everything. 
Id. 
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foreign aid.  They believe in investment, trade, and technology as levers for 
development, and they are applying these same tools in their African en-
gagement, not out of altruism but because of what they learned at home. . . .  
These lessons emphasize not aid, but experiments; not paternalism, but the 
“creative destruction” of competition and the green shoots of new opportu-
nities.167 
A better understanding of the operation of the Beijing Consensus is 
important because if members of the African Group consider the Beijing 
Consensus an attractive alternative model, it is plausible that they will also 
embrace China’s position in the international intellectual property regime.  
This is particularly true when developed countries, especially the United 
States, continue to neglect the needs and interests of developing countries 
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.168 
U.S. policymakers therefore should think more about the positions 
they have taken in the international arena—at both the multilateral and 
nonmultilateral levels.169  Efforts such as the highly controversial ACTA 
and the equally problematic TPP have not earned the United States much 
goodwill.170  Even if the provisions in those agreements can normally be 
considered acceptable, the use of a highly nontransparent “country club” 
approach to set up these agreements has made the agreements appear much 
more problematic than they may actually be.171 
Policymakers should also consider whether the United States should 
rethink its competitive strategies at the international level.  Although many 
of them have a tendency to view the rise of China as a zero-sum game, a 
growing number of policymakers and commentators have now embraced a 
nonzero-sum approach to examining the United States’ interactions with 
China and the ramifications for the latter’s rise.172  Consider, for example, 
 
 167. BRAUTIGAM, supra note 160, at 311–12. 
 168. See LEE, supra note 129, at 176 (“Westerners ignored the Africans until the Chinese 
started making deals with them.”); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 163, at 996 
(“During the Asian financial crisis, China also helped Thailand, Indonesia, and other Asian 
neighbors—countries that have been largely ignored by the United States.”). 
 169. See generally Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, supra note 3, at 9–12 (discussing 
the rise of the nonmultilateral era). 
 170. See Yu, Alphabet Soup, supra note 4 (explaining why TPP is likely to be more dan-
gerous than ACTA from a public interest standpoint). 
 171. See Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that ACTA “is 
flawed not only because it is a country club agreement but also because it is a bad country 
club agreement”); see also Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 3, at 1074–83 (criticizing the 
“country club” approach deployed by the ACTA negotiators). 
 172. See generally Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global 
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business Strategists, 
and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569 (2002) (advancing a nonzero-
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the rise of China in the context of this Article.  In a nonzero-sum view, the 
rise of China as an intellectual property power does not necessarily mean 
the United States’ decline as an intellectual property power.  Both intellec-
tual property powers could easily coexist and be mutually supportive. 
In their new book, Run of the Red Queen, Dan Breznitz and Michael 
Murphree locate in China “a remarkably profitable and sustainable model 
of innovation . . . [that] makes China into a critical part of the world inno-
vation system, but . . . does not rely on China excelling in cutting-edge 
novel-product R&D.”173  While the emergence of alternative forms of in-
novation in China has raised many intriguing questions concerning indus-
trial development and global competitiveness, the book explains why the 
Chinese model can complement the breakthrough innovation embraced by 
 
sum approach to resolving global intellectual property disputes).  As Nobel Laureate Mi-
chael Spence recently observed: 
Rebuilding an inclusive, centrist, pragmatic agenda, with a cooperative problem-
solving approach to addressing it, will take time and effort, and it is important.  
The challenges ahead to sustaining growth and expanding opportunity in the final 
fifty years of a century of convergence are large.  So also is our capacity for crea-
tivity and adaption.  But to unleash it, we need to be firmly committed to inclu-
siveness globally and to be willing to set aside overly simple and somewhat ideo-
logical prescriptions of the one-size-fits-all sort, regardless of where on the 
political spectrum they emanate from. 
MICHAEL SPENCE, THE NEXT CONVERGENCE: THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A 
MULTISPEED WORLD 272 (2011). 
 173. BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra note 6, at 19.  As Breznitz and Murphree elaborated: 
As China has become the global center for many different stages of production, it 
has also developed a formidable competitive capacity to innovate in different 
segments of the research, development, and production chain that are as critical 
for economic growth as many novel-product innovations, and perhaps even more 
so.  In addition, taken together, China’s regional and national systems have devel-
oped varied capabilities that amount to a specific and highly successful, though 
inadvertently, created national model.  China’s accomplishment has been to mas-
ter the art of thriving in second-generation innovation—including the mixing of 
established technologies and products in order to come up with new solutions—
and the science of organizational, incremental, and process innovation.  Thus, 
China’s innovation capabilities are not solely in process (or incremental) innova-
tion but also in the organization of production, manufacturing techniques and 
technologies, delivery, design, and second-generation innovation.  Those capabili-
ties enable China to move quickly into new niches once they have been proved 
profitable by the original innovator. 
Id. at 4; see also id. at 195 (noting the need to dispel the myth concerning “the Western 
techno-fetishism of novelty, which equate innovation only with the creation of new technol-
ogies and products”). 
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the United States and other developed countries.174  As Breznitz and Mur-
phree observed: 
China needed Apple to develop the concept and definition of the iPod and 
the iPhone, but Apple cannot produce and sell these products without Chi-
na.  In the world of flexible mass production, the Red Queen country [refer-
ring to China or other countries with a similar innovation model] needs the 
novel-product innovators to keep churning out new ideas, and the novel-
product-innovating countries need the Red Queen country to keep innovat-
ing on almost every aspect of production and delivery.175 
In recent literature, other scholars have also articulated new theories 
concerning China’s engagement in “cost innovation”176 and “process inno-
vation.”177  Like the form of innovation Breznitz and Murphree discussed, 
these new and varied forms of Chinese innovation—or “Chinnova-
tion”178—are easily complementary to the model of breakthrough innova-
tion embraced by the United States and other developed countries.  As 
Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson reminded us: “Far from being a zero-sum 
game . . . , the emergence of Chinese companies as significant players in 
the global market promises new benefits to the world’s consumers and new 
opportunities to those established companies that choose the right respons-
es and execute them well.”179 
In sum, it is important for the United States to consider further coop-
eration with China in an effort to push for new and constructive develop-
ments in the international intellectual property regime.  Indeed, commenta-
 
 174. See id. at 206 (“[T]hanks to the fragmentation of production, the rise of China need 
not be seen as a zero-sum game by policy makers inside and outside the country.”). 
 175. Id. at 18. 
 176. See generally ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 6 (advancing the concept of cost 
innovation and discussing its global implications).  As Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson 
pointed out, “The new competition from China is also disruptive because it threatens to ob-
solete much of the established firms’ assets, capabilities, and experience base by changing 
the accepted rules of the game, undermining traditional profit models, and growing parts of 
the market that incumbents are poorly equipped to serve.”  Id. at 55–56. 
 177. TAN, supra note 6, at xii.  As Tan Yinglan explained: 
Most of China’s companies are in the stage of process innovation.  Start-ups typi-
cally learn and adopt business models from other geographies and adapt them lo-
cally.  Companies are trying to move into technological innovation via research 
and development by building on their existing knowledge, the way semiconductor 
firms are moving into thin film in 2010.  Most Chinese firms are still using exist-
ing technology to create products, rather than creating the technology itself (as is 
done in the United States).  This makes China tech markets symbiotic and com-
plementary with the U.S. market and those in some other countries. 
Id. at 268. 
 178. Id. at 268. 
 179. ZENG & WILLIAMSON, supra note 6, at vii. 
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tors have increasingly discussed the need to use the G-2 model to facilitate 
cooperation between the two countries in response to a large variety of 
global problems,180 which range from climate change to global economic 
recovery.  As Fred Bergsten and his colleagues reminded us: 
It is now clear that an effective response to every major international eco-
nomic issue requires close cooperation between [China and the United 
States].  There will be no sustained recovery from the global economic cri-
sis unless China and the United States lead it and they have appropriately 
launched by far the largest stimulus programs in the world.  There will be 
no renewed momentum toward trade liberalization through the Doha 
Round or otherwise, a credible defense against the protectionist pressures 
that have been intensified by the crisis, unless they endorse it.  There will 
be no international cooperation on global warming unless they embrace it.  
The United States is the world’s largest deficit and debtor country, and 
China is the world’s largest surplus and creditor country, and without their 
concurrence there will be neither resolution of the global imbalances that 
helped bring on the current crisis nor lasting reform of the international fi-
nancial architecture.181 
If carefully designed, this G-2 model could be easily extended to cover in-
tellectual property matters, such as enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions, and 
development of measures to address global climate change.182 
IV.  A SLOWER TECHNOLOGICAL RISE? 
Notwithstanding the many concerns raised in the previous Part, and 
the rather alarming picture the Article has painted regarding China’s grow-
ing competitiveness, one may wonder whether China’s rise as an intellectu-
al property power would be much slower than many have anticipated.  In 
fact, most forecasts about the interactions between China and the United 
States have been forecasts at best.  Quite a number of factors affect China’s 
ability to compete with the United States in the intellectual property arena. 
 
 
 180. See Peter K. Yu, What Copenhagen Could Signal About U.S., China, DES MOINES 
REG., Dec. 17, 2009. 
 181. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES x–xi 
(2008) [hereinafter BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE]. 
 182. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 329, 378–97 (2012) (identifying ten key intellectual property agenda items that are 
important to China and other countries in Asia). 
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Table 1: Indicators on Technological Developments and  
Innovation Capabilities
183 
 United States China 
COMPARISONS BASED ON 2010 FIGURES 
GDP (US$M) 14,586,736,313,339 5,926,612,009,750 
GDP Growth (Annual %) 3.0 10.4 
GDP Per Capita (US$) 47,153 4,428 
School Enrollment, Tertiary (%) 95 26 
High-technology Exports (US$M) 145,497,804,512 406,089,687,684 
Domestic Patent Applications 241,977 293,066 
Domestic Trademark Applications 236,826 973,460 
Royalty & License Fees, Receipts 105,583,000,000 830,483,814 
Royalty & License Fees, Payments 33,450,000,000 13,039,546,459 
Royalty & License Fees, Balance 72,133,000,000 -12,209,062,645 
COMPARISONS BASED ON 2007 FIGURES 
R&D Expenditure (% of GDP) 2.67 1.40 
Researchers in R&D (per million) 4,673 1,077 
Science/Technical Journal Articles 209,898 56,811 
 
First, as far as technological and innovation capabilities are concerned, 
China is still far behind the United States (see table 1).  While China may 
be able to compete against the United States in selected sectors, it will not 
be able to effectively compete against the United States in a large variety of 
sectors. 
To some extent, the debate about China’s improvement as a techno-
logical power is similar to the ongoing debate about China’s elevation as a 
military power.  Even with the active and continuous growth of its military 
budget, it is unlikely that China will be able to quickly catch up with the 
United States.  For many commentators, China is at best a regional military 
power.184  Instead of challenging the United States directly, how it will be-
 
 183. This table builds on data provided by the World Bank.  See Data, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (last visited May 11, 2012).  Figures from 2010 and 
2007 were selected to maximize the amount of data available for comparison purposes.  As 
far as the latter figures are concerned, it is important to remember that technological and 
innovation capabilities have dramatically increased in China since 2007. 
 184. Compare Gerald Segal, Does China Matter?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 24, 
30 (“China is less like the Soviet Union in the 1950s than like Iraq in the 1990s: a regional 
threat to Western interests, not a global ideological rival.”), with Bates Gill, China as a Re-
gional Military Power, in DOES CHINA MATTER? A REASSESSMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF 
GERALD SEGAL 124, 142 (Barry Buzan & Rosemary Foot eds., 2004).  As Dr. Gill observed: 
Within a narrow regional security context, we can see that China is worthy of 
greater concern and attention.  China is transforming itself from a land-based, 
heavily mechanized force to one with air and sea capabilities for operations within 
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have in the military arena is likely to affect the United States’ strategic in-
terests in other parts of the world.185  The same is likely to be true in regard 
to China’s technological rise. 
Second, the Chinese economy is rather complex, and developments 
have been highly uneven—both geographically and across economic and 
technological sectors.186  As I have noted, such developments have resulted 
in the country’s taking a somewhat “schizophrenic” position in the interna-
tional intellectual property arena.187  While China prefers to have stronger 
protection of intellectual property rights in entertainment, software, semi-
conductors, and selected areas of biotechnology, it remains reluctant to in-
crease protection for pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, and 
foodstuffs.  Such preferences are the combined result of a huge population, 
the country’s continued economic dependence on agriculture, the leaders’ 
worries about public health issues, and the general concerns about the peo-
ple’s overall well-being.188  As a result of its “schizophrenic” preferences, 
China is likely to be on the side of the developing world with respect to 
some issues, but on the side of the developed world with respect to others. 
 
several hundred miles of its shores.  This is a change of historical proportions for 
the [People’s Liberation Army], and one that China’s regional neighbours are 
watching warily. 
Id. 
 185. As Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s senior minister, insightfully observed: “If you com-
pete with America in armaments, you will lose.  You will bankrupt yourself.  So, avoid it, 
keep your head down, and smile, for 40 or 50 years.”  It’s Stupid to Be Afraid, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE INT’L (Aug. 8, 2005), http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,151 
8,369128,00.html (providing an interview with Lee). 
 186. As I observed earlier: 
Although the subsequent founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 
helped centralize the country to a certain extent, strategic planning in the coun-
try’s formative years and the rapid economic development in China within the 
past two decades have led to greater economic development in certain parts of 
China at the expense of others.  In Deng Xiaoping’s words, “some people have to 
get rich first.”  As a result, there are now enormous disparities across the country 
in the levels of wealth and income, the purchasing power of local consumers, and 
the stages of economic and technological development. 
Peter K. Yu, Three Questions that Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China Intellectual Prop-
erty Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTEL. PROP. L. 412, 421–22 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, 
Three Questions] (footnotes omitted).  See generally Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 1, at 
203–13 (discussing the wide regional and sectoral disparities in China). 
 187. See Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual 
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (explaining why intellectual 
property developments in China should not be analyzed as if the country were homogene-
ous). 
 188. See id. at 26. 
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In fact, the complex internal economic conditions have made it diffi-
cult for China to develop an effective and coherent national strategy.  After 
all, strategies that work well for major cities, like Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou, may not work well for the countryside.189  Likewise, strategies 
that excel in prosperous coastal areas may not work for the poor rural west.  
Indeed, one of the biggest challenges for China is to come up with nation-
wide solutions that respond well to the country’s complex and divergent 
conditions and varying R & D capabilities. 
Third, most of the important intellectual property developments dis-
cussed in this Article concern patents.  Although China has the world’s 
fastest growing and largest Internet population,190 its censorship policy and 
heavily controlled information environment191 greatly stifle creativity and 
may therefore prevent dramatic improvements from taking place in the 
copyright area.  Due to variations in policy goals, administrative structures, 
and ideological obstacles, improvements may also vary greatly from one 
branch of intellectual property law to another.192 
 
 189. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 963 (“[O]ne needs to recog-
nize China as a ‘country of countries,’ rather than a homogenous one.”). 
 190. See CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER, 29TH STATISTICAL SURVEY 
REPORT ON THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 4 (2012), available at 
http://www1.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2012/2/27/112543.pdf (providing official statistics 
stating that China has the world’s largest internet population, which amounted to over 513 
million users in December 2011). 
 191. See generally Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use 
Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
1, 28–32 (2001) (discussing the Chinese censorship and information control policies). 
 192. As I noted in an article published before the State Council’s adoption of the Nation-
al Intellectual Property Strategy, which provided a major push in the patent area: 
Compared to copyrights and patents, trademark protection will create fewer obsta-
cles to China’s m odernization efforts.  Trademarks “were a state planning tool be-
fore they became a marketing device and private property,” and trademark regis-
trations continued even during the Cultural Revolution, although they have been 
decentralized and politicized, and manufacturers had used such “politically cor-
rect” pseudonyms and non-identifying labels as “Red Flag,” “East Wind,” and 
“Worker-Peasant-Soldier.”  By contrast, copyright protection affects the country’s 
ability to maintain cultural and media control and may have a negative impact on 
its extensive propaganda efforts, while patent protection slows down the country’s 
efforts by draining foreign exchange reserves in the form of royalty and license 
fee payments.  It is, therefore, no surprise that the 1982 Trademark Law was the 
first to be enacted after China’s reopening in the late 1970s, while the 1990 Copy-
right Law was the last to be enacted, only after significant pressure by the United 
States. 
Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 1, at 995 (footnotes omitted); see also ANDREW 
MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 
133–34 (2005) (noting that “the copyright bureaucracy . . . is embedded within a xitong 
[functional bureaucratic system] that concerns itself with cultural, ideological, and value-
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Moreover, a widening gap is slowly emerging in the U.S.-China intel-
lectual property debate between those U.S. industries driven by copyright 
protection, such as the movie and music industries, and those driven by pa-
tent protection.193  It remains to be seen whether the bifurcation of this de-
bate would result in greater variations in the external pressure exerted on 
China in different areas of intellectual property law.194  If such variations 
exist, improvements in these areas may vary even further. 
Fourth, as with the recent analysis of the BRICs countries, the fore-
casts of China as an intellectual property power depend on a continued 
trend of development.  Two decades ago, many predicted that Japan would 
catch up with the United States, only to be disillusioned by the Asian eco-
nomic crisis.195  The authors of the now-famous study of the BRICs coun-
tries also included the following qualification: “Our projections are opti-
mistic, in the sense that they assume reasonably successful 
development. . . .  There is a good chance that the right conditions in one or 
another economy will not fall into place and the projections will not be re-
alized.”196  Indeed, as the histories of both China and elsewhere have 
shown, many factors could disrupt the trend of successful development.  
These factors range from bad governance to natural calamities to wars to 
civil unrest.197  Rampant corruption and local protectionism could also slow 
down China’s rise as an intellectual property power, thereby preventing the 
country from realizing its full potential.198 
 
laden media and is therefore involved in a more politically sensitive environment, even if 
technical copyright issues themselves are no more or less ‘political’ than those pertaining to 
patents or trademarks”). 
 193. Such a gap exists in other intellectual property debates.  See Peter K. Yu, ACTA and 
Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1, 13–15 (2011) (discussing the complex domestic politics 
implicated by the ACTA negotiations). 
 194. See generally Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 1, at 138–40 (discussing the 
USTR’s section 301 process). 
 195. See HUNDT, supra note 104, at 14–15 (discussing the eventual triumph of the U.S. 
economy over Japan’s).  See generally EZRA F. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS 
FOR AMERICA (1979) (examining Japan’s development into one of the world’s most effec-
tive industrial powers). 
 196. Wilson & Purushothaman, supra note 151, at 3–4. 
 197. Cf. Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 31, at 354 (noting the “decades of war-
lordism, wars, famines, revolutions, and political turmoil” before China finally regained sta-
bility in the late 1970s). 
 198. See Tao Jingzhou, Problems and New Developments in the Enforcement of Intellec-
tual Property Rights in China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRIPS COMPLIANCE IN 
CHINA: CHINESE AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 107, 109 (Paul Torremans et al. eds., 2007) 
(listing local protectionism as “the greatest barrier to intellectual property rights protection 
in the PRC”); Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 26 (2000) (“Local protectionism in China is widespread and poses proba-
bly the single most significant problem in enforcement against counterfeiting.  The trade in 
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Finally, it is always difficult to prognosticate in a highly dynamic situ-
ation, such as one concerning the intellectual property and innovation sys-
tems.199  While China may be able to greatly improve its competitiveness 
on an absolute scale, how well it performs on a relative scale will depend 
on the policies of other countries, such as members of the European Union, 
India, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United States.  The more 
U.S. policymakers consider the challenges Part II identifies, the more likely 
they will push for policies that help the United States maintain its competi-
tive edge.200 
CONCLUSION 
This Article presents a tale of the rise and decline of the intellectual 
property powers.  While some would reject this tale outright, finding it im-
plausible, others would consider it highly alarming.  Although the Article 
seeks to paint a picture of the rise of China as an intellectual property pow-
er, it remains much more tentative in prognosticating the United States’ de-
cline as an intellectual property power.  In fact, it is very plausible that the 
two powers could coexist; most likely, they would do so.  They could com-
plement each other.  They could also work together to shape the interna-
tional intellectual property and trading regimes.201 
 
counterfeit goods has now become a major and vital portion of some local economies, 
providing employment for otherwise unemployable workers and generating significant rev-
enue for the local economy.”); Li Yiqiang, Evaluation of the Sino-American Intellectual 
Property Agreements: A Judicial Approach to Solving the Local Protectionism Problem, 10 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 391, 395–401 (1996) (discussing the problems of local protectionism in 
the context of intellectual property enforcement); Yu, Three Questions, supra note 186, at 
421–22 (discussing the problems of local protectionism in China).  Thanks to Bill Hennes-
sey for pushing the Author on this particular point. 
 199. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 109, at 15 (noting the difficulty of predicting the future 
for “a society that is at the cutting edge of [technological] change”); ORCUTT & SHEN, supra 
note 6, at 69 (“One reason that innovation systems are so difficult to analyze, and therefore 
thoughtfully improve, is their incredibly dynamic nature.”). 
 200. But see SACHS, supra note 132, at 259 (“No matter what success the United States 
has in recovering its dynamism and vitality in the years ahead, it is almost inevitable (bar-
ring global catastrophe) that America’s relative economic position will decline.”). 
 201. As Fred Bergsten and his colleagues pointed out in other contexts: 
The United States should . . . implement a subtle but sharp change in its basic 
economic strategy toward China.  Instead of focusing on bilateral problems and 
complaints, and seeking to coopt China into a global economic system that it 
would try to continue leading by itself, the United States should seek to develop a 
true partnership with China to provide joint leadership of that system, even if the 
system requires substantial modifications to persuade China to play that role.  The 
two economic superpowers should begin to pursue together the development of 
coordinated, or at least cooperative, approaches to global issues that can be re-
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It is important that policymakers in both China and the United States 
develop a better and deeper understanding of the implications of China’s 
rise as an intellectual property power and what such a rise would mean for 
the United States.  By thinking more about the rise and decline of the intel-
lectual property powers, and the conditions under which a country will 
cross over the intellectual property divide, we may be able to develop a 
more sophisticated understanding of the intellectual property system.  We 
may also be able to better tackle the global piracy and counterfeiting prob-
lems while exploring whether a careful and strategic recalibration of the ex-
isting intellectual property system could help accelerate the crossover pro-
cess for countries in the developing world. 
The oft-repeated story about China as a major pirating nation is too 
simple and too outdated.  Although that story fits well within the fifteen-
second sound bites usually found in media reports, it does not fully capture 
the reality.  There is no denying that China still has significant piracy and 
counterfeiting problems.  However, we should also not ignore the highly 
important, and increasingly more important, story about China’s technolog-
ical rise.  Hopefully, this Article will inspire us to think more about this 
largely omitted story and what it means for the intellectual property policy 
debate. 
 
 
solved effectively only through their active co-management.  Such a “G2” ap-
proach would accurately recognize, and be perceived by the Chinese as accurately 
recognizing, the new role of China as a legitimate architect and steward of the in-
ternational economic order. 
BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE, supra note 181, at 22–23. 
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